Communicating uncertainty about facts, numbers, and science by Bles, Anne Marthe van der et al.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/116193                            
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
COMMUNICATING UNCERTAINTY 
 
1 
 
Communicating uncertainty about facts, numbers, and science 
 
 
 
Anne Marthe van der Bles1,2, Sander van der Linden1,2, Alexandra L. J. Freeman1, James 
Mitchell3, Ana B. Galvao3, Lisa Zaval4, & David J. Spiegelhalter1 
 
 
 
Authors’ copy. Accepted for publication at Royal Society Open Science. Cite as: 
 
Van der Bles, A. M., Van der Linden, S., Freeman, A. L. J., Mitchell, J., Galvao, A. B., Zaval, L., 
& Spiegelhalter, D. J. (in press). Communicating uncertainty about facts, numbers, and 
science. Royal Society Open Science.  
 
 
 
1 Winton Centre for Risk and Evidence Communication, Department of Pure Mathematics 
and Mathematical Statistics, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom 
 
2 Cambridge Social Decision-Making Lab, Department of Psychology, University of 
Cambridge, United Kingdom 
 
3 Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, United Kingdom 
 
4 Department of Psychology, Columbia University, United States 
 
 
 
Corresponding author: Anne Marthe van der Bles, amv46@cam.ac.uk  
  
COMMUNICATING UNCERTAINTY 
 
2 
Abstract 
 
Uncertainty is an inherent part of knowledge, and yet in an era of contested expertise, many 
shy away from openly communicating their uncertainty about what they know, fearful of 
their audience’s reaction. But what effect does communication of such epistemic 
uncertainty have? Empirical research is widely scattered across many disciplines. This 
interdisciplinary review structures and summarises current practice and research across 
domains, combining a statistical and psychological perspective. This informs a framework 
for uncertainty communication in which we identify three objects of uncertainty - facts, 
numbers, and science - and two levels of uncertainty: direct and indirect. An examination of 
current practices provides a scale of nine expressions of direct uncertainty. We discuss 
attempts to codify indirect uncertainty in terms of quality of the underlying evidence. We 
review the limited literature about the effects of communicating epistemic uncertainty on 
cognition, affect, trust, and decision-making. While there is some evidence that 
communicating epistemic uncertainty does not necessarily affect audiences negatively, 
impact can vary between individuals and communication formats. Case studies in economic 
statistics and climate change illustrate our framework in action. We conclude with advice to 
guide both communicators and future researchers in this important but so far rather 
neglected field. 
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Communicating uncertainty about facts, numbers, and science 
 
 
Uncertainty: a situation in which something is not known, or something that 
is not known or certain (Cambridge Dictionary)[1] 
 
Uncertainty is all-pervasive in the world, and we regularly communicate this in everyday life.  
We might say we are uncertain when we are unable to predict the future, we cannot decide 
what to do, there is ambiguity about what something means, we are ignorant of what has 
happened, or simply for a general feeling of doubt or unease. The broad definition above 
from the Cambridge dictionary reflects these myriad ways the term ‘uncertainty’ is used in 
normal speech.  
 
In the scientific context, a large literature has focused on what is often termed ‘aleatory 
uncertainty’ due to the fundamental indeterminacy or randomness in the world, often 
couched in terms of luck or chance. This generally relates to future events, which we can’t 
know for certain. This form of uncertainty is an essential part of the assessment, 
communication and management of both quantifiable and unquantifiable future risks, and 
prominent examples include uncertain economic forecasts, climate change models, and 
actuarial survival curves.  
 
In contrast, our focus in this paper is uncertainties about facts, numbers and science due to 
limited knowledge or ignorance – so-called ‘epistemic’ uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainty 
generally, but not always, concerns past or present phenomena that we currently don’t 
know but could, at least in theory, know or establish.1 Such epistemic uncertainty is an 
integral part of every stage of the scientific process: from the assumptions we have, the 
observations we note, to the extrapolations and the generalisations that we make. This 
means that all knowledge on which decisions and policies are based — from medical 
evidence to government statistics — is shrouded with epistemic uncertainty of different 
types and degrees.   
 
Risk assessment and communication about possible future events are well-established 
academic and professional disciplines. Apart from the pure aleatory uncertainty of, say, 
roulette, the assessment of future risks generally also contains a strong element of 
epistemic uncertainty, in that further knowledge would revise our predictions: see the later 
example of climate change. However there has been comparatively little study of 
communicating ‘pure’ epistemic uncertainty, even though failure to do so clearly can 
seriously compromise decisions – see Box 1.  
 
                                                        
1 We may, for example, have epistemic uncertainty about future events that have no randomness attached to 
them but that we currently don’t know (for example, presents that we might receive on our birthday that have 
already been bought: there is no aleatory uncertainty, only uncertainty caused by our lack of information, 
which will updated when our birthday arrives).  In this paper we do not consider concepts that are not even 
theoretically knowable, such as non-identifiable parameters in statistical models, knowledge about 
counterfactual events, or the existence of God. We refer the reader to Manski [27] for a discussion of 
“nonrefutable” and “refutable” (or testable) assumptions in econometrics. 
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Box 1. The importance of uncertainty communication: the tale of the ‘dodgy dossier’ 
  
On the 24th September 2002, the British government published a document entitled “Iraq’s 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government [2].” It included 
claims about Iraq having programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and nuclear 
ambitions, and provided a ‘case for war’. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, however, the Iraq 
Survey Group found no active weapons of mass destruction and no efforts to restart a 
nuclear programme. 
 
Given these obvious gaps between the document and subsequent findings in reality, an 
independent investigation (the Butler Review) was set up in 2004. The Butler Review 
concluded that although there was no deliberate distortion in the report, expressions of 
uncertainty in the intelligence, present in the original non-public assessments, were 
removed or not made clear enough in the public report. 
 
"We believe that it was a serious weakness that the JIC’s warnings on the limitations of the 
intelligence underlying some of its judgements were not made sufficiently clear in 
the dossier.” ([3]; p.82 and p.114)  
 
In the US, it was the Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 
(NIE) called “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction”[4] that was the 
analogous document pre-invasion. A US Senate Select Committee investigation was even 
more critical of it than the Butler Review in the UK, but its second conclusion was similar: 
 
“Conclusion 2. The Intelligence Community did not accurate or adequately explain to 
policymakers the uncertainties behind the judgments in the October 2002 National 
Intelligence Estimate.” ([5]; p16) 
 
The removal of considerable expressions of uncertainty from both documents had a 
dramatic effect on the opinions of the public and governments, and in the UK at least the 
removal of the uncertainties was considered key to paving the way to war. 
 
 
Recent claims that we are living in a ‘post-truth’ society [6] do not seem encouraging for 
scientists and policy makers to feel able to communicate their uncertainty openly.  Surveys 
suggest declining levels of trust in governments and institutions [7–9], although trust in 
scientists apparently remains high in both the UK and US [10,11]. Anecdotal experience 
suggests a tacit assumption among many scientists and policy makers that communicating 
uncertainty might have negative consequences, such as signalling incompetence, 
encouraging critics, and decreasing trust (for example, see [12]). In contrast, an alternative 
view as proposed by for example the philosopher O’Neill [13] is that such transparency 
might build rather than undermine trust in authorities [13].   
 
In order to know which of these conflicting claims hold, empirical evidence on the effects of 
communicating uncertainty about facts, numbers, and science needs to be collected and 
reviewed. This process faces two major challenges. First, the existing empirical research on 
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the effects of communicating epistemic uncertainty is limited. Second, “communicating 
epistemic uncertainty” can mean many different things. It can be a graph of a probability 
distribution of the historic global temperature change, a range around an estimate of the 
number of tigers in India, or a statement about the uncertainty arising from poor-quality 
evidence, such as a contaminated DNA test in a criminal court. All these variations may 
influence how the communication of uncertainty affects people.  
 
In this paper we present a cohesive framework that aims to provide clarity and structure to 
the issues surrounding such communication. It combines a statistical approach to 
quantifying uncertainty with a psychological perspective that stresses the importance of the 
effects of communication on the audience, and is informed by both a review of empirical 
studies on these effects and examples of real-world uncertainty communication from a 
range of fields. Our aim is to provide guidance on how best to communicate uncertainty 
honestly and transparently without losing trust and credibility, to the benefit of everyone 
who subsequently uses the information to form an opinion or make a decision. 
 
 
A framework for communicating epistemic uncertainty 
In contrast to the numerous attempts at generic taxonomies of uncertainty, the framework 
proposed in this paper is specifically geared to the task of communication: a comparison 
with other proposals is made in the next section. Based on Lasswell’s venerable model of 
communication [14], our framework addresses who communicates what, in what form, to 
whom, and to what effect whilst acknowledging the relevant context as part of the 
characteristics of the audience. This framework for uncertainty communication is displayed 
in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1. Basic deconstruction of the communication of epistemic uncertainty based on the 
Lasswell model of communication [14]. Our emphases in this paper – what, in what form, 
and to what effect, are indicated in bold. 
 
 
The first two factors in our framework relate to who is communicating (briefly covered in 
Section 1): 
 
• the people assessing the uncertainty, who will generally be ‘experts’ of some kind, 
such as individual scientists, scientific groups such as the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), or official bodies such as national statistical organisations.  
These are essentially the ‘owners’ of the uncertainty. 
• the people doing the communication, who may include technical experts, 
communication professionals, and journalists, often acting on behalf of institutions. 
 
Factors related to what is being communicated are (Section 2): 
 
• the object about which there is uncertainty, in terms of facts, numbers or scientific 
models and hypotheses. 
• the source of the uncertainty, as in the reasons for the lack of knowledge. 
• the level of the uncertainty communicated: from direct uncertainty about a fact, to 
the indirect uncertainty or lack of confidence in the underlying science.   
• the magnitude of the uncertainty, from a small lack of precision to a substantial 
degree of ignorance. 
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Factors relating to the form of the communication (Section 3): 
 
• the expression of the uncertainty, such as a full probability distribution or just a 
brief mention that uncertainty exists.  
• The format of the uncertainty communication, in terms of numbers, visualisations, 
or verbal statements. 
• the medium of the communication, such as print, online, broadcast, or verbal 
conversation. 
 
Factors relating to whom is being communicated to (briefly covered in Section 4): 
 
• The characteristics of the audiences, for example in terms of their varying levels of 
numeracy and (graphical) literacy, their expertise and knowledge of the field. 
• The relationship of the audience to what is being communicated, such as whether 
the topic is contested or emotionally laden for them. 
• The relationship of the audience to the people doing the communication, including 
perceived credibility and whether there is trust or distrust between audience and 
communicators. 
 
Finally, factors relating to what effect the communication has on the audience (Section 5): 
 
• The effect of communication on the audience’s cognition, emotion, trust, and 
behaviour and decision-making.  
 
The first three sections of this paper follow the list above, briefly describing the who before 
concentrating on the what and the form of the communication. We illustrate current 
practice in uncertainty communication in a variety of domains including forensics, 
environment health risks, public health, conservation biology, history and military 
intelligence. In the last two sections, we review the current, rather limited, academic 
literature evaluating the psychological effect of uncertainty communication — including 
visual, verbal and numerical formats — and what is known about the mediating effects of 
audience characteristics. The focus of this paper is on clarifying and structuring what is 
being communicated and in what form, and reviewing what we know about its effects. Only 
brief comments are provided about the who and to whom components. 
 
Next, two case studies are presented: one in the field of climate change and one in the field 
of official economic statistics. These serve to illustrate how our framework of approaching 
uncertainty communication might be used to analyse current real-world graphics and 
messages, and inform future research and development of more evidence-based 
communications. The final discussion summarises our contribution and provides key points 
for both communicators and researchers of communication.  
 
A worthy eventual goal would be empirically-based guidance for a communicator on the 
likely forms, levels and prominence of uncertainty communication that would suit their 
audience and aims. This study is intended to make a start towards that aim and we 
summarise our conclusions (so far) for communicators in Box 5. 
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Other frameworks for uncertainty 
Many taxonomies of uncertainty have been made in a range of disciplines, often being 
concerned with ‘deeper’ uncertainties inherent in any formal models that have been 
constructed as ways of representing our scientific understanding of the world around us. 
For example, in the context of integrated assessment models for climate change, Walker 
and colleagues [15] separated uncertainty about the context, the structure of the model 
itself, the outcomes considered, and the weights or values being assigned to outcomes, 
while van Asselt and Rotmans [16] deconstruct ‘source’ to list five sources of uncertainty 
due to variability and seven sources of uncertainty due to limited knowledge. Morgan and 
colleagues [17] emphasise numerical expression of uncertainty, including placing 
probabilities on alternative models, while in contrast Kandlikar and colleagues [18] 
proposed a qualitative scale of confidence in the underlying science, based on the degree of 
expert agreement and quality of underlying evidence (this corresponds to our ‘indirect’ level 
of uncertainty, as outlined in Section 2.3: see also the Case Study 2 on climate change 
before the Discussion). 
 
Within medicine, Han [19] characterises uncertainty in clinical decision-making in terms of 
probability of future uncertain outcomes, ambiguity about what those probabilities are, and 
complexity of the problem. In a general scientific context, Wynne [20] considers 
‘indeterminacy’ to mean the uncertainty about what scientific knowledge fits the current 
situation, and ‘ignorance’ as when we don’t know what we don’t know about the 
completeness and validity of our knowledge, which by definition escapes recognition. Under 
the generic banner of ‘incertitude’, Stirling [21] uses the term ambiguity for when there is 
doubt about outcomes, and ignorance when both probabilities and outcomes cannot be 
confidently specified. Funtowicz and Ravetz’ NUSAP scheme for reporting numbers [22] 
emphasises the ‘pedigree’ (the P in NUSAP), again corresponding to our ‘indirect’ level of 
uncertainty, reflecting the quality of the underlying evidence. 
 
In spite of all this activity, no general consensus has emerged as to a general framework, 
perhaps due to the wide variety of contexts and tasks being considered, and the complexity 
of many of the proposals. Our structure, with its more restricted aim of communicating 
epistemic uncertainty, attempts to be a pragmatic cross-disciplinary compromise between 
applicability and generality. The individual elements of it are those factors which we believe 
(either through direct empirical evidence or suggestive evidence from other fields) could 
affect the communication of uncertainty and thus should be considered individually. 
 
 
1. Who is communicating? 
Following the structure given in Figure 1, we note briefly the importance of identifying who 
is communicating uncertainty. The people assessing and communicating uncertainty are 
many and varied, from specialists assessing evidence to communication officers or the 
media. They might be the same people doing both, or might be different people intimately 
involved – or not – in each other’s task. Communicators may intend to have very different 
effects on their audiences, from strategically-deployed uncertainty (also known as 
“merchants of doubt”) to transparent informativeness. For example, in the report on the 
document “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British 
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Government” [2] discussed in Box 1 it was noted that the differences in uncertainty 
communication were in part because: “The Government wanted a document on which is 
could draw in its advocacy of its policy. The JIC sought to offer a dispassionate assessment 
of intelligence and other material…” ([3] para 327). 
 
As will be commented on further in the to whom section, assessors and communicators of 
uncertainty might have an existing relationship with the audience they are communicating 
to, which might be characterized by trust or distrust. A review of the literature on source 
credibility falls outside the scope of this paper, but we do want to raise the point of 
considering who is assessing and communicating uncertainty, their goals for 
communication, and their relationship with the audience. These factors influence the choice 
of communication form and the effects of communication. 
 
 
2. What is being communicated?  
2.1 The object of uncertainty 
Perhaps the first crucial question is: what are we uncertain about? Our specific focus is on 
residual epistemic uncertainty following scientific analysis, which will generally mean 
constructing a model for whatever is being studied, in the sense of a formal representation 
of available knowledge that contains certain assumptions about the values of potential 
variables, the process by which they are observed, and the way in which they interact.  
 
As previously emphasised, in contrast to these encompassing taxonomies our more 
restricted focus is on communicating epistemic uncertainty about facts, quantities, and 
scientific hypotheses.   
 
1. Facts: These can be formally considered as categorical variables that are (at least 
theoretically) directly verifiable, for example whether or not the midsummer arctic ice-
sheet has reduced in size over the last decade, or whether the number of homicides has 
increased in the last year; or one of a number of possibilities, such as who committed a 
particular crime. It is important that one category might be ‘none of the above’ – see 
Box 2. 
 
 
Box 2. When we admit we do not know all the possibilities  
 
Donald Rumsfeld’s famous discourse on the importance of ‘unknown unknowns’ highlighted 
the need to consider possibilities that cannot be currently identified [23]. While usually used 
as a motivation for developing resilient strategies for dealing with unforeseen future events, 
sometimes termed ‘black swans’, the idea can also apply to epistemic uncertainty about 
possible explanations or facts when it takes the form of a ’none of the above’ category, 
meaning an eventuality that cannot be currently given a label. Examples might include a 
perpetrator of a crime who is not on the list of suspects, or a scientific mechanism that has 
not yet been formulated. It will generally be challenging to place a probability on this ‘other’ 
category. 
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The humility to admit the possibility of being wrong is sometimes known as Cromwell’s Law, 
after Oliver Cromwell’s celebrated plea in the face of the Church of Scotland’s obstinacy: “I 
beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken” [24] [p.18]. 
 
 
 
2. Numbers: These are continuous variables that describe the world. They may, at least in 
principle, be directly observable, or they may be theoretical constructs which are used 
as parameters within a model of the world. Examples of the former are the number of 
tigers in India, the current proportion of unemployed, or the growth in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in the UK last year. Objects such as these which are being quantified 
always need to be carefully defined. This is clear when the object is an artificial construct 
such as GDP, but the definition of ‘unemployed’ rests on changing convention, and even 
a ‘tiger’ needs unambiguous definition. 
 
Other quantities may be parameters of scientific models that cannot be directly 
observed but are only estimated within a scientific modelling framework, such as the 
size of risks associated with carcinogens, the average treatment effect of a drug, or the 
percentage of anthropogenic influence on global temperature over the last century – 
such parameters are often denoted by Greek letters such as q. 
 
3. Scientific hypotheses: These are theories about how the world works, expressed as 
structural models of the relationship between variables, such as whether a particular 
exposure is carcinogenic, or the form of the dose-response relationship between 
ionising radiation and harm. We will generally be uncertain about the most appropriate 
assumptions in a mathematical representation of the world. Remembering statistician 
George Box’s adage that “all models are wrong”, but some are “useful” [25] [p.792], we 
should in principle distinguish between the uncertainty about the adequacy of a model 
to represent the world (‘Does my map include all existing islands?’), and uncertainty 
about the world itself (‘Does this island actually exist?’). However, in practice, the lines 
between these often get blurred: the Higgs Boson cannot be directly observed, and so 
its existence is inferred as a component of a model that may, in future, be superseded.  
Scientific models and hypotheses are, like parameters, not directly observable “things”, 
but working assumptions.   
 
To illustrate these different objects of uncertainty, suppose you are asked to flip a coin – 
you flip it and cover it up immediately without seeing it. You now need to communicate 
your uncertainty about what the coin shows. In an idealised world, the answer is 
straightforward: your uncertainty about the fact of whether the coin shows heads (Object 1) 
is expressed by your probability2 of ½. This is a classic example of communicating 
uncertainty through the mathematical language of probability. 
 
But the real world can be more complicated, and not so readily quantifiable. Even fair coins 
may not be exactly balanced, and so there is inevitably a small element of uncertainty 
                                                        
2 Note that this is a probability in the Bayesian sense, expressing personal epistemic uncertainty rather than 
randomness. 
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around the number ½ (Object 2). This should be negligible provided the coin was flipped 
and not spun on its edge – a spun US penny coin is reported to land heads-up only around 
20% of the time [26]. But additional knowledge might alter this probability: for example, if 
you know that the coin was heads-up before it was flipped, this changes the probability that 
it lands heads-up to around 51%.   
 
Further, if you suspect the person who gave you the coin was a trickster, then the coin 
might even be two-headed and the probability of a head becomes one. So your confidence 
in the scientific model for the coin (Object 3) is vital, and this will depend on the evidence 
available about the situation - something not readily reduced to a numerical expression.3 
 
2.2 Sources of uncertainty  
A wide range of reasons for scientific uncertainty can be identified, including: 
 
(1) variability within a sampled population or repeated measures leading to, for 
example, statistical margins-of-error 
(2) computational or systematic inadequacies of measurement 
(3) limited knowledge and ignorance about underlying processes, and  
(4) expert disagreement.   
 
The source may affect the response to uncertainty; it is an empirically researchable question 
whether, for example, difficulty in measurement versus expert disagreement as sources of 
uncertainty have different effects on an audience.  
 
Different sources of uncertainty can lead to different forms of communication. For example, 
when assessing the number of migrants to a country in a preceding year, the impact of 
sampling variation due to survey design may be quantifiable and therefore communicated 
as a confidence interval. And in econometrics, partial identification is able to use the 
available (perhaps incomplete) data to communicate bounds around statistics or 
parameters of interest, by considering a weaker set of assumptions than required 
for point identification [27,28]. However, the uncertainty due to non-representative 
samples or inaccurate responses may be more difficult to quantify than the sampling 
variation (and yet possibly be of a greater magnitude) and so may need to be expressed in a 
different way.  
 
2.3 The level of uncertainty  
A vital consideration in communication is what we have termed the level of uncertainty: 
whether the uncertainty is directly about the object, or a form of indirect ‘meta-uncertainty’ 
– how sure we are about the underlying evidence upon which our assessments are based. 
This differs from the common distinction made between situations where probabilities are, 
or are not, assumed known. In the context of uncertainty quantification, the former is 
known as 1st order uncertainty and the latter 2nd order uncertainty, often expressed as a 
probability distribution over 1st order probability distributions or alternative models. An 
                                                        
3 However, Bayesian researchers perform “Bayesian model averaging” which places subjective probabilities on 
the correctness of alternative, candidate scientific models; see the Technical Appendix for further discussion. 
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alternative categorisation derives from Knight [29] and Keynes [30], who distinguish 
quantifiable risks from deeper (unquantifiable) uncertainties.   
 
In contrast to both these approaches, we have observed that the major division in practical 
examples of communication comes between statements about uncertainty around the 
object of interest, which may or may not comprise precise 1st-order probabilities, and a 
‘meta-level’ reflection on the adequacy of evidence upon which to make any judgement 
whatever. We therefore consider that, when communicating, it is most appropriate to 
distinguish two fundamental levels of uncertainty:   
 
Direct uncertainty about the fact, number, or scientific hypothesis. This can be 
communicated either in absolute quantitative terms, say a probability distribution or 
confidence interval, or expressed relative to alternatives, such as likelihood ratios, or 
given an approximate quantitative form, verbal summary and so on. 
 
Indirect uncertainty in terms of the quality of the underlying knowledge that forms a 
basis for any claims about the fact, number or hypothesis. This will generally be 
communicated as a list of caveats about the underlying sources of evidence, possibly 
amalgamated into a qualitative or ordered categorical scale. 
 
This division neither matches the traditional split into 1st/2nd order nor 
quantified/unquantified uncertainty. Direct uncertainty may be assessed through modelling 
or through expert judgement, involving aspects of both 1st and 2nd order uncertainty, and 
may be quantified to a greater or lesser extent, whereas indirect uncertainty is a reflexive 
summary of our confidence in the models or the experts.4 An example of a system designed 
to communicate indirect uncertainty is the GRADE system of summarising overall quality of 
evidence, which we discuss further in Section 3. 
 
Box 3 demonstrates the difference between direct and indirect uncertainty within a legal 
context where we hope the distinction between the two levels is particularly clear. 
 
 
Box 3. The expression of levels of uncertainty in legal reasoning. 
 
Consider an archetypal criminal legal case in which the impact of a specific item of evidence 
on the possible guilt of a suspect is being considered.  
 
Direct uncertainty concerns the absolute probability of guilt, and the relative ‘probative 
value’ given to an item of evidence for or against guilt of this particular suspect.  
 
                                                        
4 If we feel we 'know' the probabilities (pure 1st order uncertainty), for example when we have an 
unbiased coin, then in a sense there is no indirect uncertainty, since there are no caveats except for 
our assumptions.  But as soon as assumptions are expressed, there is the possibility of someone else 
questioning them, and so they may have caveats.  This reinforces the fact that epistemic uncertainty 
is always subjective and depends on the knowledge and judgements of the people assessing the 
uncertainty. 
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Indirect uncertainty would be reflected in the credibility to be given to an individual’s 
testimony concerning this item of evidence.  
 
In this context, these uncertainties are usually communicated in verbal terms: for example, 
direct absolute uncertainty may be expressed as “beyond reasonable doubt”, direct relative 
uncertainty may be communicated by saying some forensic evidence “supports” or ‘is 
consistent with” the guilt of the accused, while the indirect quality of the background 
knowledge might be introduced in cross-examination by querying the competence of the 
forensic expert or their access to appropriate data.  
 
These ideas can be given a formal mathematical expression that may help understanding.  
Let G and I represent the uncertain facts of the guilt or innocence of the accused, and d 
represent the specific item of forensic evidence being considered, for example a footprint or 
DNA. Bayes theorem provides the appropriate formal structure for taking into account 
forensic evidence, and can be written as 
 !(#|%)!('|%) = 	!(%|#)!(%|') 	× 	!(#)!(') .	 
 
Here !(#|%) represents the absolute probability that the suspect is guilty, and !('|%) 	=	1	 − 	!(#|%) the probability that they are innocent (although such quantifications would 
not normally be allowed in a legal trial). This is communication of direct, absolute 
uncertainty. 
 
  .(/|0).(/|1)  is the ‘likelihood ratio’, which expresses the relative support given to Guilt over 
Innocence by the item of evidence. In DNA evidence this would typically be the inverse of 
the ‘random-match probability’, the chance that the DNA would be found on a randomly 
chosen member of other possible culprits, typically of the order of more than 1 in 10 million.  
Note that this would not mean there was 1 in 10 million chance that the suspect was 
innocent – this error in interpretation is known as the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’. Likelihood ratios 
are therefore expressions of relative uncertainty and commonly communicated in bands, so 
that a likelihood ratio between 1,000 and 10,000 would be interpreted as ‘strong support’ 
for the guilt of the suspect [31]. Likelihood ratios could be multiplied together for 
independent items of forensic evidence to provide an overall level of support of the 
evidence for guilt: this is currently not permitted in UK courts. 
 
Finally, indirect uncertainty can be expressed as the confidence in the claim of ‘10 million’, 
which would be based on the quality and size of the database relevant to this case, and 
other factors such as potential contamination.  
 
 
2.4 The magnitude of the uncertainty 
It seems intuitive that the magnitude of uncertainty being communicated would likely 
influence the audience’s response to it – it could indeed be seen as one of the commonest 
goals of uncertainty communication. However, it is often not explicitly drawn out as an 
important variable in empirical work (see Section 5 where this is discussed). 
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3. In what form is the uncertainty communicated? 
3.1 Expressions of uncertainty 
Each of the different kinds of uncertainty discussed in Section 2 can be expressed in a wide 
range of forms, and these forms may affect the effects of uncertainty communication. In 
this section, we consider the space created by the different dimensions that we have used 
to define uncertainty and how it can be filled by different expressions. 
 
Direct uncertainty (Absolute expressions) 
Direct uncertainty about a fact, number or scientific hypothesis is the type of uncertainty 
which can be the most precisely expressed and therefore lends itself to the widest possible 
range of forms of expression. In Figure 2 we list these forms, in order of their decreasing 
precision (capability of expressing detail of magnitude). 
 
 
Figure 2. Alternative expressions for communicating direct uncertainty about a fact, 
number, or scientific hypothesis 
 
Expressions at the top of the list can be considered as Donald Rumsfeld’s ‘known unknowns’ 
[23], whereas his ‘unknown unknowns’ would fall under expression vii, in which uncertainty 
is acknowledged without being able to provide a list of possibilities.  
 
In order to explore whether each in this list of 9 expressions of absolute, direct uncertainty 
could be applied to all three objects of uncertainty in our framework: categorical or binary 
facts, continuous variables (numbers) and models we set out to find real examples of each in 
use. The result of our search is shown in Table 1. We were not able to find examples for 
each cell in the table, illustrating where some usages are rare at best. However, our 
intention was both to test the comprehensiveness of our framework and to illustrate it to 
help others identify how it can be applied. We fully admit that some of the entries are 
ambiguous: for example, as we shall see in Box 4, the IARC’s claim of a ‘probable carcinogen’ 
is more an indirect summary of the quality of evidence for carcinogenicity, rather than a 
direct expression of probability and so may not belong in the table at all. 
 
i. A full explicit probability distribution
ii. A summary of a distribution
iii. A rounded number, range or an order-of-magnitude assessment
iv. A predefined categorisation of uncertainty
v. A qualifying verbal statement
vi. A list of possibilities or scenarios
vii. Informally mentioning the existence of uncertainty
viii. No mention of uncertainty
ix. Explicit denial that uncertainty exists. 
Decreasing 
precision
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Direct uncertainty (Relative expressions) 
Relative uncertainty about competing hypotheses or values for a measure can also be 
expressed in different forms. Verbal comparisons include statements of the form ‘A is more 
likely than B’, while numerical expressions include likelihood ratios for comparing facts and 
scientific hypotheses, likelihood functions for relative support for different numbers, and 
comparative measures of model adequacy such as the Akaike Information Criterion [32] or 
Bayesian Information Criterion [33]: formal definitions are provided in the Technical 
Appendix on statistical approaches to communicating epistemic uncertainty. P-values are a 
measure of conflict between data and a hypothesis, and are certainly not direct expressions 
of a probability of hypotheses. However, as described in the Technical Appendix, in many 
circumstances they correspond to a specific confidence interval for a numerical parameter. 
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Table 1: Exploring examples of real-world use of each of the 9 possible expressions of direct, absolute uncertainty about 
each of the three possible objects of uncertainty: facts (categorical variables), numbers (continuous variables) or 
hypotheses (models) 
 
EXPRESSION Object = Potentially observable facts,  
categorical and binary measures 
Object = Numbers (i.e. continuous 
variables) either directly measurable or 
constructed 
Object = Models and hypotheses 
 
(1) A full explicit probability distribution, 
communicated numerically or visually 
 
  
 
Domain: History. In forensic analysis of 
the skeleton found underneath a car park 
in Leicester in 2012 [34], researchers 
claimed a 96% probability that the 
individual had blue eyes and 77% 
probability that he had fair hair. 
Combining the forensic evidence using the 
method of likelihood ratios outlined in Box 
2, it was concluded that the probability 
that the skeleton is that of Richard III lies 
between 0.999994 and 0.9999999. This 
was deemed sufficient to warrant a full 
burial in Leicester Cathedral. 
 
Domain: Public health. Full posterior 
probability distributions for the uncertain 
prevalance of Hepatitis C in England are 
provided graphically by Harris et al 2012 
[35]. 
Domain: Biology. Posterior probabilities of 
alternative phylogenies (evolutionary 
pathways) are produced by software, e.g. 
MrBayes [36]. 
(2) Summary of a distribution 
communicated numerically or visually 
 
E.g.: 95% confidence intervals, error bars, 
margins of error, fan charts 
 Domain: History. Using household survey 
methods, the victims of violence the Iraq 
war have been estimated as 601,027 
deaths up to June 2006 (95% confidence 
interval of 426,369 to 793,663) [37]. These 
figures are contested, and there is further 
uncertainty due to disagreement between 
sources, for example a different survey 
estimated 151,000 deaths due to violence 
(95% uncertainty range, 104,000 to 
223,000) [38]. 
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(3) A rounded figure, range or an order-of-
magnitude assessment 
 
E.g.: number between x and y, up to x 
(without information about the underlying 
distribution).  
  Domain: Species Population Estimates.  
From Global Wild Tiger Population Status, 
April 2016 document [39]: “In 2014, India 
undertook its largest, most intensive and 
systematic national tiger population 
survey. The survey included new areas and 
more intensive sampling. The survey 
estimated the population to range 
between 1,945 to 2,491 with a mean 
estimate of 2,226 tigers.” 
  
 
(4) A predefined categorization. 
 
 
Domain: Climate Change. From the 2013 
IPCC summary for policy makers of 
Working Group 1 (The Physical Science 
Basis): “It is likely that the rate of global 
mean sea level rise has continued to 
increase since the early 20th century.” 
Likely is defined as 66 - 100% likelihood. 
[40] 
  
 
Domain: Public Health.  
The International Agency for Research on 
Cancer has classified RF fields as “possibly 
carcinogenic to humans,” based on limited 
evidence of a possible increase in risk for 
brain tumours among cell phone users, 
and inadequate evidence for other types 
of cancer. This is one of a predefined 
categories expressing certainty of 
carcinogenicity (see Box 4) [41].   
  
(5) Qualifying verbal statements applied to 
a number or hypothesis. 
 
E.g., around x, roughly x, very likely x, 
probably x.  
 
E.g., not very likely that.. likely that.. if not 
defined more formally.  
 
Domain: History. A quote from an essay 
on the trail of Jeanne d’Arc by Pierre 
Champion: “he had studied theology at 
Paris for eight years, and that the 
provincial chapter had designated him to 
"read the Bible." It is, therefore, not very 
likely that he could have been master of 
theology by 1431, at least at the University 
of Paris.” [42] 
 
Domain: Politics. From an MSNBC 
interview with Senator Jeff Merkeley: 
“Q: You’re saying it looks like some 
Americans helped the Russians and the 
Domain: Biology. From a Science News 
article, titled “How Much Did the Dodo 
Really Weigh”: “Andrew Kitchener set 
about trying to figure out what a dodo 
would have looked like. [...] Kitchener 
eventually concluded that the dodo was a 
much slimmer bird than artists made it 
look, probably in the range of 10.5 to 17.5 
kilograms.” [44]  
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bigger question is just whether they were 
affiliated with Donald Trump or not? 
A: Yes, I’m saying it is very likely – it’s very 
likely and we need to get to the bottom of 
who was involved here.” [43] 
 
(6) List of possibilities 
 
E.g., it is x, y, or z.  
Domain: Health. From a fact sheet on 
Abnormal Prenatal Cell-free DNA 
Screening Results by the National Society 
of Genetics Counsellors: “An abnormal 
result may indicate an affected fetus, but 
can also represent a false positive result in 
an unaffected pregnancy, confined 
placental mosaicism, placental and fetal 
mosaicism, a vanishing twin, an 
unrecognized maternal condition or other 
unknown biological occurrence.” [45] 
 
Domain: Legal epidemiology. “In Barker v 
Corrs Lord Hoffman had specifically 
considered the situation where the 
Claimant suffered lung cancer that might 
have been caused by exposure to asbestos 
or by other carcinogenic matter but might 
also been caused by smoking and it could 
not be proved which was more likely to be 
the causative agent.”[46] 
 
Intelligence. Barack Obama in the Channel 
4 television documentary “Bin Laden: 
Shoot to Kill” (2011): “Some of our 
intelligence officers thought that it was 
only a 40 or 30% chance that Bin Laden 
was in the compound. Others thought that 
it was as high as 80 or 90%. At the 
conclusion of a fairly lengthy discussion 
where everybody gave their assessments I 
said: this is basically 50–50.” [47] 
 
Domain: Species Extinction. From a 
National Geographic article on Dinosaur 
Extinction: “Scientists tend to huddle 
around one of two hypotheses that may 
explain the Cretaceous extinction: an 
extraterrestrial impact, such as an asteroid 
or comet, or a massive bout of volcanism.” 
[48]  
 
(7) Humility: Mentioning uncertainty  
 
statements about possibility of being 
wrong, the fact that uncertainty exists, 
unknown unknowns, etc.  
Domain: Law. From a report in 
Computing: “Leading legal experts 
disagree about whether the EU's General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is in 
fact already in force in the UK…. Speaking 
at a recent Computing event, Bridget 
Kenyon, head of security at University 
College London, explained that the GDPR is 
Domain: Law (on film). A quote from the 
film 12 Angry Men: “Nine of us now seem 
to feel that the defendant is innocent, but 
we're just gambling on probabilities. We 
may be wrong. We may be trying to return 
a guilty man to the community.” [50]  
 
Domain: Physics. From a book chapter on 
the evolution of Quantum Field Theory by 
Gerard ‘t Hooft: “At first sight, quantum 
chromodynamics (QCD) seems to be an 
exception: the theory is renormalizable, 
and by using lattice simulations one can 
address its infrared behaviour. Here, 
however, we have to keep in mind that 
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already in force, in her opinion. "Actually 
GDPR is in force now, but what's not in 
place yet is the penalties," said Kenyon. 
"So if there's a breach now, the ICO could 
hold on to it and give you the penalties in 
May 2018," she argued. 
Computing queried both the ICO itself, and 
several legal experts on the veracity of this 
claim, and found conflicting opinions, 
suggesting a degree of uncertainty rules in 
the industry.” [49] 
Domain: Law. From the document 
“Findings of facts and reasons” in the case 
The judicial authority in Sweden -v- Julian 
Paul Assange: “He does not agree that he 
was informed that she had made a 
decision to arrest Mr Assange, and 
believes he was not told until 30th 
September. I cannot be sure when he was 
informed of the arrest in absentia.” [51]  
 
Domain: Forensics. The court permitted 
the expert to testify that “in my opinion, 
the DNA profiling evidence provides 
support for the view that some of the DNA 
recovered was from Ashley Thomas, but I 
am unable to quantify the level of this 
support.” [52] 
  
mathematical proofs for the internal 
consistency of this theory are still lacking. 
Most of us believe without doubt that the 
theory will work fine under all 
circumstance, with unlimited precision in 
principle, and we have good reasons for 
this belief, but we cannot be sure.” [53] 
(8) No mention of uncertainty 
 
Domain: Forensics. Extract from the 
judgement R -v- Deen, 1994 [54]: 
“Q-So the likelihood of this being any other 
man but Andrew Deen is one in 3 million? 
A-Yes 
Q…What is your conclusion? 
A-My conclusion is that the semen has 
originated from Andrew Deen. 
Q-Are you sure of that? 
A-Yes” 
 
[N.B. This is a classic case of the 
‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ and the expert 
witness is drawing an incorrect 
conclusion from the evidence] 
Domain: Economics. The Office for 
National Statistics Statistical Bulletin, UK 
labour market: October 2017, reports the 
unemployment figures: “For June to 
August 2017, there were 1.44 million 
unemployed people, 52,000 fewer than for 
March to May 2017 and 215,000 fewer 
than for a year earlier.” [55] 
 
Domain: Health. Q-Risk cardiovascular risk 
calculator [56]: “Your risk of having a heart 
attack or stroke within the next 10 years is 
12.3%.” 
  
Domain: Climate Change. From the 
American Association for the 
Advancement of Science Board Statement 
on Climate Change: "The scientific 
evidence is clear: global climate change 
caused by human activities is occurring 
now, and it is a growing threat to society." 
[57] 
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(9) Explicit denial uncertainty exists Domain: War/Terrorism. From a speech 
by US vice president Dick Cheney to the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) national 
convention in Nashville, Tennessee, on 
August 26, 2002: “Simply stated, there is 
no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has 
weapons of mass destruction” [58] 
 
Domain: Legal. From the judgement in the 
case Regina v. Pendleton (on Appeal from 
the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)): 
“We have no doubt that the conviction 
was safe.” [59] 
 Domain: Biology. "The statement that 
organisms have descended with 
modifications from common ancestors—
the historical reality of evolution—is not a 
theory. It is a fact, as fully as the fact of 
the earth's revolution about the sun." 
[60]  
 
Domain: Physics. University of California, 
Berkeley physicist Daniel McKinsey in an 
interview with CBC: "It's certainly there. 
We know dark matter exists" [61] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMMUNICATING UNCERTAINTY 
 
21 
Indirect uncertainty (Quality of underlying evidence) 
Methods for communicating the quality of the underlying evidence do not give quantitative 
information about absolute values or facts, but summarise the subjective confidence we 
have in any claim.  
 
In order to attempt to assess indirect uncertainty, a number of fields have established 
checklists to try to assess the quality of evidence in as objective a way as possible: these 
may relate to either of an individual claim, such as the CONSORT system, for determining 
the characteristics of the claims resulting from a randomised controlled trial [62], and the 
Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods, for determining the strength of a crime prevention 
study [63], or the totality of evidence, attempting to take into account the quality, quantity 
and consistency of multiple studies to give an overall assessment of the confidence we can 
have in a particular assertion: see [64] and [65] for reviews. These tools provide the basis for 
systems that attempt to communicate overall quality of evidence (although the distinction 
between methods of assessment and methods of communication of indirect uncertainty is 
rarely made). 
 
Many methods of communicating indirect uncertainty have been developed in different 
fields. Limitations in the underlying evidence might be summarised by qualitative verbal 
caveats, or an ordered set of categories (which may be communicated numerically, 
graphically or verbally). For example, the GRADE Working Group has established a scale for 
communicating the quality of the evidence underlying claims about the effects of medical 
interventions, which ranges from ‘Very low quality’, graphically represented as a single plus 
symbol and/or circle, to ‘High Quality’, graphically represented as 4 plus symbols and/or 
circles [66]. Other examples are the ‘padlock’ ratings used by the UK‘s Educational 
Endowment Foundation [67] (Figure 3), or the US National Intelligence Council’s 
recommendation that intelligence analysts provide a qualitative assessment of analytic 
confidence on a high/medium/low scale “based on the scope and quality of information 
supporting our judgments” (p. 5) [68]. In effect, such ordered scales provide a form of ‘star-
rating’ for the conclusions.  
 
These broad categorical ratings are used when the impact of poorer quality evidence is 
difficult to quantify. One issue with such broad categorical ratings or verbal descriptions 
(“high quality”) is that their meaning is in part dependent on the context of their use: at 
what threshold evidence is classified as high quality or low quality might depend on the 
research field or topic. The audience, especially if they are non-experts, might not be aware 
of this. In addition, research has shown that there is considerable variation in people’s 
interpretation of verbal probability and uncertainty words such as “likely” [69–72]. There 
might be a similar variability in what people interpret “high quality” or “low quality” to 
mean, which might make such broad categorical ratings or verbal descriptions less effective.  
However, it might be hoped that, with additional knowledge or judgement, some caveats 
could contribute to a direct, quantitative expression of uncertainty: for example, by 
widening a confidence interval due to the potential systematic bias in a survey. 
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Figure 3. The Education Endowment Foundation’s summary of five educational 
interventions, in terms of cost, evidence strength and impact measured in months of 
educational advancement. ‘Evidence strength’ is a summary of the quality of evidence 
(indirect uncertainty) underlying the estimates of impact on an ordered categorical scale, 
analogous to a ‘star-rating’.  
 
In practice, both direct and indirect uncertainty are often expressed simultaneously, as 
demonstrated by the following Cochrane systematic review: 
 
“We found that giving immunotherapy, mainly vaccine-based (aiming to activate the host 
immune system to induce human immune response to tumour-specific antigens), after 
surgery or radiotherapy did not, on average, make people live longer.” “We found a small, 
but not statistically significant, improvement in OS (HR 0.94, 95% CI 0.83 to 1.06; P = 0.35), 
…; high-quality evidence)” [73] 
 
In this example, the number of primary interest is the Hazard Ratio (HR) – the proportional 
change in overall survival (OS) for people given immunotherapy. The hazard ratio is 
estimated to be 0.94, corresponding to a 6% reduction in the risk of dying in a fixed time 
period, and the direct, absolute uncertainty around this figure is communicated as a 95% 
confidence interval (0.83 to 1.06). This is a ‘ii’ on our scale of methods of communicating 
absolute uncertainty – a summary of a distribution for the true value. 
 
The p-value (0.35) expresses the weak evidence that the true value of the Hazard Ratio is 
different from 1 (i.e. that those given immunotherapy really did live longer than those who 
were not given this therapy). Formally, this says there is a 35% chance of having observed at 
least the observed 6% relative change in survival if there were actually no effect of the 
immunotherapy (and all the other modelling assumptions are correct) — an effect not 
considered to be statistically significant (when the alpha level is set at the conventional 
0.05). This p-value can be translated to an absolute expression: it means that a 65% 
confidence interval for the true effect just excludes 1. 
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The quality of the evidence behind these direct claims is expressed through the GRADE 
scale, with ‘high-quality’ and the symbolic 4 ‘+’ (see Figure 4) meaning that we as readers 
can put good faith in both the confidence interval and the p-value.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. A Cochrane ‘summary of findings’ table illustrating both direct (confidence 
interval) and indirect (GRADE scale) levels of uncertainty [73].  
 
 
This amount of information could potentially be overwhelming, and difficult to illustrate 
graphically and interpret, so organisations have (apparently without recourse to empirical 
testing) sought less comprehensive forms of uncertainty communication. These may try to 
conflate the different levels of uncertainty to try to simplify the message, but Box 4 shows 
this has clear potential for confusion. We cite these examples as a useful warning to 
practitioners considering constructing a ‘simplified’ method of communicating the 
uncertainties in their field. 
 
 
Box 4. Ways that institutions try to simplify uncertainty communication – and the 
problems that can arise as a result.  
 
When institutions or regulatory bodies have to communicate uncertainty, they often 
attempt a simplified rule-based classification, which can easily be followed by all members 
of the organisation. However, devising such a system without acknowledging the potential 
for confusion has led to problems.   
For example, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), has a long-standing 
series of monographs assessing the carcinogenicity of exposure to various potential 
mutagens. For different items of evidence, a scale for the quality of the research (indirect 
level) is combined with the apparent strength of evidence (a direct, relative level), leading to 
classifications such as “sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in humans” and “evidence 
suggesting lack of carcinogenicity in animals”. An algorithm then combines these 
assessments for different strands of evidence to finally classify different agents on the 
direct, four-category scale for scientific hypotheses mentioned in Table 1: “Carcinogenic to 
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humans”, “Probably carcinogenic to humans”, “not classifiable”, “Probably not carcinogenic 
to humans” [41]. 
However, this scale does not give any numerical interpretation to ‘probably’, and gives no 
information about the size of any carcinogenic effect, leading to considerable confusion in 
public communication. For example, processed meats and cigarettes are placed in the same 
category – “Carcinogenic to humans” – not because they are equally carcinogenic, but 
because the evidence around each is judged equally suggestive of a link. 
 
Somewhat similarly, the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics uses a set of 
judgemental rules to classify genetic variants in terms of their likelihood of being 
pathogenic, proposing that “the terms “likely pathogenic” and “likely benign” be used to 
mean greater than 90% certainty of a variant either being disease causing or benign to 
provide laboratories with a common, albeit arbitrary, definition [74].” But there is no firm 
empirical, numerical basis for ‘certainty’ to be determined, and no indication to a patient 
regarding how possessing the ‘pathogenic’ variant might affect them (in terms of likelihood 
or severity of any effect). Patients who are given the information that they have been found 
to have a ‘likely pathogenic’ variant are therefore no better informed about the possible 
consequences for them. 
 
 
Methods have been proposed for turning indirect into direct uncertainty.  In the context of a 
meta-analysis of health-care interventions, Turner et al. [75] demonstrate that experts can 
take caveats about lower-quality studies and express their impact in terms of subjective 
probability distributions of potential biases. When these are added to the nominal 
confidence intervals, the intervals appropriately widen and the heterogeneity of the studies 
explained. These techniques have been tried in a variety of applications [76,77] and show 
promise, although they do require acceptance of quantified expert judgement. 
 
3.2 Format and medium of uncertainty communication  
The other important aspects of the ‘how’ in our framework of uncertainty communication 
(Figure 1) are the format and the medium. Uncertainty can be expressed in one (or a 
combination) of three different formats: visual, numeric, and/or verbal. The appropriate 
format in part depends on the medium of communication, which might be written and 
printed official reports, online websites, smart phone applications, print media, television, 
or spoken in person or on the radio. We therefore consider these two aspects of format and 
medium together. However, these different formats have the potential to carry different 
levels of information and therefore choosing one is not simply a design choice – it can 
influence the type of expression of uncertainty available and its potential effect on the 
audience. Expressions i-iv in Section 3.1 are predominantly numerical or visual expressions; 
expressions v-ix are predominantly verbal (and less precise). 
 
Whereas numeric (numbers) and verbal (words) communication are relatively constrained 
in their design, there is a variety of ways to communicate uncertainty visually. Examples of 
common ways to visualise epistemic uncertainty around a number, expressed as an 
estimate with a range (‘i’ or ‘ii’ in our scale), are presented in Figure 5. Error bars are widely 
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used in scientific and other publications to illustrate the bounds of a confidence interval, but 
provide no indication of the underlying distribution of the number. Other visualisations 
attempt to give an (approximate) idea of this underlying distribution: for example, 
diamonds, which are often used when considering treatment effects in a medical meta-
analysis, or violin plots, which are designed to give a more accurate idea of the underlying 
distribution. Fan plots are designed to show the bounds of several different confidence 
intervals (often coloured to emphasise the changing probability density going further from 
the point) and are used, for example, by the Bank of England when communicating past and 
forecasted future GDP estimates. Finally, density strips are the most accurate 
representation of the underlying probability distribution around the point estimate.    
 
 
 
Figure 5. Common expressions of uncertainty around numbers, illustrated using the 
immunotherapy example in Figure 4: an i) Error bar; ii) Diamond; iii) Violin plot; iv) Fan plot; 
and a (v) Density strip. 
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Such visualisations have primarily been explored within the context of future risks, and 
Spiegelhalter, Pearson, and Short [78] reviewed different types of visualisations of 
uncertainty about the future, such as bar charts, icon arrays, fan charts or probability 
distributions. In contrast, MacEachren and colleagues [79] reviewed different types of 
visualisation of epistemic uncertainty in spatial data such as maps or medical imaging: 
various attributes of the colours and lines used to construct a map may be varied to 
illustrate uncertainty  [79], while colour saturation, crispness and opacity, as well as the 
addition of specific indicators (glyphs) may give uncertainty information (such as the IPCC’s 
use of the ‘+’ sign on its climate maps). One main conclusion from both reviews is that 
whereas a wide variety of types of graphics have been developed to communicate 
probabilities, there is limited empirical evidence of alternative formats may influence 
audience understanding and response.  
 
4. Communicated to whom? 
The goal of communication is to affect an audience in some way: to inform, motivate, 
instruct, or influence people. The effects of uncertainty communication depend not only on 
the aspects discussed so far, such as the object of uncertainty and the format of 
communication, but also on the characteristics of the target audience and on the 
relationship between the audience and the communicator, the topic, or source of the 
uncertainty. Important differences between individuals, such as their level of expertise, 
prior attitudes [80], numeracy skills [80,81], education level [82], or optimism [83,84], might 
mean that the same communication of uncertainty affects people differently. For example, 
people’s interpretation of information can be shaped by situations in which a topic is 
contested or has become politicized; or by the situational context in which the information 
exchange takes place (e.g., under high stress). To illustrate, studies show that people 
selectively seek out information that is consistent with their prior beliefs and sometimes 
process it more fluently than information that is inconsistent with their prior beliefs, 
phenomena variously described as motivated cognition and confirmation bias [85–88]. 
Through these processes, the audience’s pre-existing beliefs or attitudes towards the 
communicator, topic or object of uncertainty might influence or change the effects of 
uncertainty communication.  
 
As a case in point, Dieckmann, Gregory, Peters, and Hartman [80] found that when 
participants judged uncertainty communicated as a range around the predicted average 
global surface temperature increase, people who indicated more climate change acceptance 
were more likely to perceive a normal distribution or a distribution in which higher values 
were more likely. In contrast, people who indicated less climate change acceptance were 
more likely to perceive a uniform distribution or a distribution in which lower values were 
more likely [80]. In addition, people’s prior beliefs about the source of uncertainty for a 
certain topic might influence the effects of uncertainty communication. Indeed, for some 
topics or in some decision settings, people might expect uncertainty (for example, during 
weather forecasts [89]), whereas in others, they might be less welcoming of uncertainty 
information [90,91]. 
 
Unfortunately, there is very little systematic empirical work studying these effects on the 
communication of epistemic uncertainty. In Section 5 we highlight where these factors have 
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been part of the studies, and we will examine the important issue of credibility and trust in 
more detail in Section 5.3. The key point is that it is important for effective communication 
to know your audience.  
 
 
5. Communicated to what effect? 
The fifth and final section of our framework (Figure 1) concerns the psychological effects of 
communicating uncertainty. Evaluating these effects is important, as this can help establish 
whether the communication of uncertainty has achieved its intended goal and whether it 
might have had any unintended consequences.  
 
We reviewed what is known about the impact of communicating epistemic uncertainty on 
human cognition (understanding), emotion (feeling), trust, and decision-making. We did this 
by searching the literature for empirical research in psychology, judgment and decision-
making, and related disciplines. This review informed the construction of our framework; 
and here we use the framework in turn to structure the reporting of the findings of the 
review. 
 
Before reporting those findings, we should explain that it is important to distinguish 
epistemic or scientific uncertainty from the subjective psychological experience of 
uncertainty—the feeling which might be the result of an ambiguous communication. 
Psychological uncertainty is a human experience, usually defined as an aversive 
psychological state in which an individual lacks information. In other words, it describes the 
subjective feeling of “not knowing” [92,93]. The psychological experience of uncertainty has 
been extensively investigated: the fact that people are averse to ambiguous information has 
been referred to as “one of the most robust phenomena in the decision-making literature” 
[94] [p.1]. That is not the subject of our reviewing; we focus on uncertainty that is the 
property of a fact, number, or model that is being communicated. 
 
Second, we limit the scope of our review to the psychological effects of communicating 
epistemic uncertainty as defined in our introduction. This follows our argument that it is 
important to conceptually distinguish aleatory uncertainty (unknowns due to inherent 
indeterminacy or randomness) from epistemic uncertainty due to our lack of knowledge 
about a past or present fact or number (which often could, in principle, be known): these 
may or may not influence a future event. We expect that there may be important 
differences in the psychological impact of communicating aleatory versus epistemic 
uncertainty. In fact, Fox and Ülkümen [95] elude to this distinction by recalling one of the 
most difficult decisions Barack Obama had to make during his presidency. In deciding 
whether or not to launch an attack against a compound that was suspected to house Osama 
Bin Laden, he faced two qualitatively different forms of uncertainty. The first concerns 
uncertainty about a measurable fact (either Bin Laden resided at the compound or he did 
not) but the second type of uncertainty revolved around possible futures: is the mission 
going to be successful or not? Fox and Ülkümen make a compelling argument that judgment 
under uncertainty is indeed likely to invoke a conscious or unconscious attribution to 
epistemic and aleatory forms of uncertainty. For example, people seem to express 
psychological differences in these two forms of uncertainty in natural language, whereas 
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pure epistemic uncertainty is often expressed as the degree of confidence in one’s 
knowledge about a fact, aleatory uncertainty is more likely to be expressed in probabilities 
associated with future outcomes [96].  
 
We agree with Fox and Ülkümen that most researchers continue to treat uncertainty as a 
“unitary” construct [95]. At present, the existing research we have reviewed has 
predominantly investigated reactions to aleatory uncertainty, or has conflated the two 
kinds. For example, although epistemic uncertainty may be part of an ambiguous 
experimental situation (e.g. not knowing the exact probability distribution of a gambling 
task), ambiguity aversion is often—but not exclusively— about people’s aversion to using 
this information for making decisions about future event with a random component. This is 
not our focus, but we recognize that the two types of uncertainty can interact and 
sometimes one may qualify the other. Accordingly, we will sometimes draw on relevant 
work about ambiguity to inform our discussion of the effects of epistemic uncertainty, 
because few existing empirical studies have clearly made this distinction.  
 
Thirdly, here we are only considering one level of uncertainty: direct uncertainty. Empirical 
work on the effects of communicating indirect uncertainty (quality of evidence) deserves a 
separate treatment elsewhere. 
 
We structure our narrative review here according to the expressions of direct uncertainty 
we identified in Section 3.1, ranging from expression i) full distributions to ix) denying 
uncertainty. As far as we know, expression viii (not mentioning uncertainty) and ix (denying 
uncertainty) have not been explicitly studied, and are left to the Discussion. Where 
conclusions from studies appear to be drawn across multiple forms of expression, we have 
conflated those different categories under the same headings below for clarity. 
  
We also note that this literature is particularly widely scattered and that the review is not 
meant to be systematic. We have cited all relevant studies that we have found, and aimed 
to cover a broad array of studies representative of findings in the field. Because we cannot 
offer an in-depth review of each single study, we have instead opted to highlight particularly 
insightful relevant studies in more detail for illustrative purposes throughout. 
 
5.1 The effect of communicating uncertainty on cognition  
The term cognition is generally used as a bin to describe mental processes or actions that 
make up “thinking”, such as the processing, interpretation, and retrieval of information, 
including attention, memory, judgment, and evaluation. In this section, we discuss 
psychological research that has investigated how various expressions of uncertainty 
influence people’s interpretation and understanding of information.  
 
5.1.1 Expressions i and ii: Full and summaries of distributions.  
Some research has explored how people interpret error bars and related visualisations of 
mean and error in graphs. For example, Correll and Gleicher [97] examined the extent to 
which people could make accurate statistical inferences about information presented in bar 
charts with error bars, compared to alternative representations of mean and error, for 
example violin plots and gradient plots (see Figure 4). Bar charts can lead to biased 
interpretations: They suffer from “within-the-bar-bias”, where values within the bar are 
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seen as more likely than values outside the bar, and error bars do little to correct this bias 
[98]. Gradient plots and violin plots however are visually symmetric and continuous, and 
indeed Correll and Gleicher’s results showed that these can help people to make 
judgements that are more in line with statistical expectations (i.e. the actual probability of a 
certain value).  
 
5.1.2 Expression iii: Ranges.  
Early research by Johnson and Slovic [99] examined the presentation of uncertainty through 
range estimates. Their hypothetical scenario involved an example that described the 
likelihood of getting cancer from drinking water that contains a particular chemical (1 in 
1,000,000). Although this number was presented as the most likely estimate, the message 
noted that the true risk could be as low as zero or as high as 10 in 1,000,000. Using a 
convenience sample of the American public, Johnson and Slovic’s research suggested a 
potential upward bias, where about half of respondents thought that the highest number is 
the correct figure (although the other half of respondents disagreed; for comparative 
evidence see also [91,100]). 
 
Johnson and Slovic’s [99] research suggests that people’s interpretation of the distribution 
underlying a range can differ. Research by Dieckmann, Peters, and Gregory [81] showed 
similar results for ranges representing future uncertainty: When presented with just a 
numerical range, most people indicted that they perceived either a uniform or normal 
distribution, but some perceived a u-shaped distribution. They found that providing more 
information, such as a best estimate within the range or including a picture of a normal 
density plot, led more people to indicate that they perceived a normal distribution.    
 
In subsequent research, Dieckmann, Gregory, Peters, and Hartman [80] showed that 
people’s interpretation of numerical ranges can be influenced by motivated reasoning. 
Motivated reasoning is a cognitive shortcut where people interpret information in a way 
that is consistent with a predetermined conclusion [101]. In general, this appears to lead 
people to perceive uncertain information as having more variance [86], which facilitates 
biased assimilation. For example, in Dieckmann and colleagues’ study [80], people’s prior 
beliefs about global warming changed their interpretation of the distribution of a numerical 
range in a way that was congruent with their personal beliefs. Yet, such biases can be 
corrected. For example, Dieckmann and colleagues [80] showed that opportunistic 
tendencies to interpret uncertainty in a motivated manner were reduced by pointing out 
how to correctly interpret the uncertainty in question [102]. 
 
Overall, this research suggests that depending on their exact presentation, numerical ranges 
can be interpreted differently by different people. In general, graphics may help people 
recognise uncertainty; but it is important to choose an appropriate type of graphic to 
convey uncertainty properly. Some information about the distribution seems important for 
people to interpret ranges more accurately.  
 
5.1.3 Expressions iv and v: predefined categorisations and qualifying verbal statements.  
A sizable body of research has focused on determining how people interpret various verbal 
expressions of uncertainty and how consistent such interpretations are. Interpretation is 
mostly determined by assigning probability percentages to verbal uncertainty expressions or 
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by rank ordering them. Several literature reviews have suggested that whereas individuals 
are internally consistent, there is substantial variability between individuals in their 
interpretation of uncertainty expressions [69–72]. This suggests that whereas one person 
would interpret a word such as ‘likely’ similarly across different encounters (for example 
meaning ‘at least 50% chance’), another person could have a very different interpretation of 
what ‘likely’ means (for example, ‘at least 75%’).  
 
Other studies have even contested the degree of internal consistency in people’s 
interpretation of verbal probability expressions. For example, verbal expressions of 
probability can be heavily dependent on the psychological context [103,104]. A few studies 
have offered partial explanations for such context-effects, such as the perceived base rate 
of an event [105]. It is important to note that although people often seem to have a 
(potentially strategic) preference for verbal expressions of probability [104], these cognitive 
inconsistencies are problematic for communication [103].  
 
This has been pointed out most clearly in the domain of climate change. Budescu, Por, and 
Broomell [70] examined people’s interpretation of verbal probability expressions used in 
reports from the IPCC, which covered both statements with aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainty. They found that people consistently misinterpret the intended meaning of 
IPCC’s uncertainty expressions, mostly indicating probabilities that were less extreme than 
IPCC’s guidelines prescribe. For example, whereas the IPCC intends the expression “very 
likely” to indicate a probability of 90% or higher, the typical or median response from 
participants was approximately 65%-75%. Furthermore, there were large differences 
between individuals in their interpretation of the expressions, which were found to be 
associated with prior beliefs about climate change. Indeed, several studies have observed 
that qualifiers such as “most” or a “majority” in statements of fact, such as “the majority of 
climate scientists have concluded that human-caused climate change is happening”, are 
interpreted at around 60% whereas the communicator typically intends to convey scientific 
agreement between 90% and 100% [106–109]. Importantly, such inconsistencies can be 
reduced by including numeric information alongside or in place of verbal probability 
expressions [70,107,110].  
 
Other interpretation issues remain. For example, Teigen, Juanchich, and Riege [111] found 
that when people are presented with a histogram showing the actual frequencies of 
occurrence of quantifiable events, such as the battery life of a laptop or how long it takes to 
post a letter from Norway to the US, and are then asked to choose a value that represents 
“unlikely” or “improbable”, people consistently choose values that have a near 0% 
frequency of occurrence — as opposed to picking low values that have actually occurred in 
the sample. For example, when battery life is shown to range between 2.5 and 4.5 hours, 
people think that 5 or 6 hours are better examples of “improbable” duration than those that 
actually occur in 10% of cases. This “extremity” effect is thought to be influenced by 
framing, where negative (unlikely) or positive (likely) verbal frames focus people on the 
(non)-occurrence of an event [112,113]. 
 
In sum, this research suggests that there is considerable variation in how verbal expressions 
of uncertainty are interpreted, both between different people and within the same person 
in different contexts. One solution to decrease variability in interpretation could be to 
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supplement verbal expressions with numeric information: research has demonstrated that 
this can be effective in increasing alignment between people’s interpretation and the 
intended meaning of words in a predefined categorization (e.g. [110]). However, recent 
research on expressions of future (including aleatory) uncertainty indicates that including 
numeric information may not reduce the extremity effect [114].  
 
5.1.4 Expressions vi and vii: Listing possibilities and mentioning uncertainty.  
Another form of verbal uncertainty communication involves simply listing various 
possibilities or mentioning uncertainty through, for example, caveats. Such general 
statements about scientific uncertainty can cover both uncertainty about the object in 
question (e.g., fact, quantity, model) as well as the strength or quality of underlying 
evidence or science. Corbett and Durfee [115] examined the effects of communicating 
uncertainty in news stories about climate science. They focused on mentioning 
disagreement or controversy among scientists through a lack of context in which to 
interpret the meaning of the findings. Their results showed that news stories that included 
expert disagreement increased people’s perceptions of uncertainty about climate science, 
whereas news stories that included context decreased perceptions of uncertainty.  
 
These findings appear to be quite general. Indeed, when uncertainty about quantifiable 
facts, such as the scientific consensus on climate change and vaccine safety, is contested 
implicitly through caveats or expert disagreement, perceived uncertainty about the science 
typically increases [116–118]. Yet, exceptions do exist. For example, research in the context 
of emerging technologies found that verbally highlighting broad scientific uncertainty about 
nanotechnology did not meaningfully change more general beliefs about the uncertainty of 
scientific evidence [119].  
 
5.2 The effect of communicating uncertainty on emotions and affective reactions  
A large literature in psychology illustrates that people process uncertain information in two 
qualitatively different ways: Slovic and colleagues [120] for example differentiate between 
processing risk “as analysis” vs. risk “as feelings”. Dual-process theories in psychology 
commonly describe two systems of thinking, with one system being more “analytic”, 
following rules of logic, probability, and deliberation whereas the other is more associative, 
fast, intuitive, and affective [121–125]. Although the functional, anatomical, and 
psychological differences between these two systems have not gone without criticism [e.g. 
see 87], it is important to consider the impact of uncertainty communication on people’s 
affective reactions, given that emotional responses are often dominant in processing risk 
information [120,124,127,128]. In addition, people’s emotions and affective reactions exert 
an important influence on decision-making [129–131]. Comparatively, there is less work on 
affect than on cognition in the context of epistemic uncertainty communication specifically. 
We could not find any prior studies that have explored the emotional effects of full or 
summary probability distributions (expressions i and ii) or predefined categories & 
qualifying statements (expressions iv and v). 
 
5.2.1 Expression iii: Ranges.  
The effects of communicating uncertainty on people’s emotions has been studied to some 
extent in the medical domain. For example, in a number of focus groups with 48 American 
adults, Han, Klein, Lehman, Massett, Lee, and Freedman [83] found that numerical risk 
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ranges (e.g. “your risk of colon cancer is somewhere between 5% and 13%”) elicited more 
worry from most people than a point estimate (“…9%”), but for others they noted the 
opposite effect or indifference between formats. In a series of follow-up studies, Han, Klein, 
Lehman, Killam, Massett and Freedman [84] presented people with either a point estimate 
or a numerical range without a point estimate, and did this either in text or in a visual 
format (a bar graph from 0-100%). The results indicated that compared to no uncertainty, 
presenting uncertainty as a numerical range in text increased people’s reported levels of 
worry about developing colon cancer and perceived risk, but in a visual format uncertainty 
decreased worry and risk. A follow-up experiment comparing a range being presented in 
text or in combined visual-text formats did not yield any significant differences in worry and 
perceived risk between the text and visual formats. This research suggests that epistemic 
uncertainty might influence emotional responses, but that the exact form of communication 
matters and that more research is needed to gain a better understanding of how people’s 
affective reactions are shaped by the communication of scientific uncertainty. This work 
also found some potential influences of individual differences. They found that people high 
in dispositional optimism reported less cancer-related worry after being shown a cancer risk 
estimate with uncertainty communicated as a range compared to just the point estimate. 
 
5.2.2 Expression vi: listing possibilities.  
Van Dijk and Zeelenberg [132] examined the impact of communicating uncertainty as a list 
of possibilities about facts on people’s affective responses. In the first of two experiments, 
they asked people to imagine participating in a game in which they won a prize: a prize that 
was either certain (two conditions: definitely winning a CD vs. definitely a dinner) or a prize 
that was uncertain (they were told to imagine that they won either a CD or a dinner). 
Participants who were presented with an uncertain prize reported to be less happy, less 
satisfied, and felt less good than students in either of the certain prize conditions. In the 
second experiment, participants were asked to imagine winning one of two certain prizes or 
the uncertain prize in a lottery, but subsequently to imagine they had lost their lottery ticket 
and would not be able to claim the prize. In this case, participants who were presented with 
an uncertain prize reported feeling less unpleasant, disappointed, and bad than participants 
in both certain prize conditions. This research suggests that communicating uncertainty as a 
list of possibilities about a fact (which prize people won) can either dampen or heighten 
people’s emotional responses to this fact. 
 
5.2.3 Expression vii: mentioning uncertainty as caveats. Jensen and colleagues [133–135] 
studied the effects of communicating scientific uncertainty through verbal statements 
addressing caveats or limitations (vs. a generic statement presenting low uncertainty) about 
cancer research in news stories. They examined people’s affective responses, specifically 
cancer fatalism, “a disposition defined by feelings of angst and nihilism” [135] and 
nutritional backlash, which is described as a range of negative feelings such as fear, guilt, 
worry, and anger about dietary recommendations [134,135]. The results across these 
studies were inconsistent: their first research [134] found a decrease in cancer fatalism and 
a marginally significant decrease in nutritional backlash for people who had read news 
stories that contained higher levels of scientific uncertainty. Follow-up research [135] 
however did not find an effect of uncertainty on cancer fatalism and nutritional backlash, 
but did find a decrease in fatalism and nutritional backlash for people who had read news 
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stories that depicted disclosure (in which uncertainty statements were attributed to the key 
researchers covered in the news story) rather than expert disagreement.  
 
Overall, it appears that more research is needed in order to gain a better understanding of 
the effects of epistemic uncertainty about science, facts and numbers on people’s affective 
and emotional reactions. Furthermore, research is often unclear as to whether “emotion” is 
meant to tap into a fast evaluative judgment of a stimuli (affect), or whether discrete 
emotions are of interest (e.g. fear, worry), and how these are or should be measured (e.g. a 
physiological response to uncertainty vs. self-report). In short, the limited research 
described above reports inconsistent results: it appears that communicating uncertainty can 
have an impact on people’s emotions, but that the nature of the impact might be 
dependent on how emotions are defined and measured as well as how uncertainty interacts 
with other characteristics of the communication.  
 
5.3 The effect of communicating uncertainty on trust and credibility 
People’s relationship with trust is asymmetrical: it takes a long time to forge but can be 
destroyed in an instant [136]. At a generic level, there are some near-universal aspects of 
human social cognition that assist people in determining whom and what information to 
trust. Two of these basic dimensions include “competence” and “warmth” [137]. Affect and 
cognition fuse together here in establishing trust. In order to be perceived as credible, both 
“cold” expertise is required (knowledgeability) as well as a perceived motivation to be 
sincere and truthful (“warmth”), that is, a feeling of trust [138,139].  
 
Although scientists and researchers generally score high on perceived competence and 
expertise, they are often perceived to lack warmth, a key component of which is 
“trustworthiness” [140]. More generally, a decline in public trust of regulators and industry 
has been observed [141]. To remedy this relationship, Fiske and Dupree [140] suggest that 
rather than trying to persuade, warmth can be gained by openly discussing and sharing 
scientific information. Yet, whether greater transparency in the communication of 
uncertainty will enhance credibility and public trust remains an open empirical question 
[142]. On one hand, presenting information as certain (when it is not) is misleading and can 
damage and undermine public trust. Thus, emphasising uncertainty may help signal 
transparency and honesty. On the other hand, explicitly conveying scientific uncertainty 
may be used as a tool to politicise science [143], or to undermine the perceived competence 
of the communicator as people tend to use precision as a cue for judging expertise [144]. 
Research into how the communication of scientific uncertainty impacts trust and credibility 
is very sparse, and we found examples from only three of forms of expression of 
uncertainty. Those three were: 
 
5.3.1 Expression ii and iii: Summaries of distributions and ranges.  
Early research by Johnson and Slovic ([145]; see also section 8.2.1.2) found that a discussion 
of range estimates in the context of environmental health risks signalled government 
honesty for a majority of their sample. However, in a similar follow-up study, results were 
more mixed where equal numbers agreed and disagreed about perceived honesty [99]. 
Moreover, about a third felt that a range discussion made the government seem less 
competent; and about 40% of the sample did not think the government was telling the 
truth. A later study, including a re-analysis of this earlier research by Johnson [146], suggests 
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that communicating uncertainty through range estimates revealed mixed results, signalling 
honesty and competence for sizable portions of participants across studies (25% to 49%) but 
also dishonesty and incompetence for non-negligible minorities (8% to 20%).  
 
Similarly, in a series of small focus groups, Schapira, Nattinger, and McHorney [82] explored 
responses to a line graph that visualised an estimate of breast cancer mortality relative risk 
reduction of mammography screening. The representation of uncertainty through a 
confidence interval led to confusion and decreased trust in the information for women in 
the less-educated groups. Women in the higher-educated groups were “more accepting” of 
such scientific uncertainty and in general indicated that the confidence interval should be 
presented to patients, so that all information is available for decision-making. Similar results 
have been found for individual differences in numeracy [147]. 
 
Yet Lipkus, Klein, and Rimer [148] found no effect of format: in a pre-post design, 
participants found a point estimate just as credible and trustworthy as a range of risks about 
breast cancer. In the context of individualised colorectal cancer risk, Han and colleagues [84] 
also found no main effect of uncertainty (confidence interval vs. point estimate) or format 
(visual vs. text) on perceived credibility, which included a measure of trust. Similarly, Kuhn 
[149], using a relatively small student sample, evaluated four communication formats (point 
estimate, verbal uncertainty, numerical range, biased range) across five (aleatory and 
epistemic) environmental hazards and found no main effect of uncertainty on trust in 
science or government.  
 
In contrast, van der Bles, van der Linden, Freeman, and Spiegelhalter [150] distinguish 
between trust in the numbers and trust in the source, as they find that introducing 
uncertainty about a range of numbers (e.g. the number of tigers in India, unemployment in 
the UK, global sea level rise) reduces trust in the number but not necessarily in the source. 
This also varies by format (or precision), with much greater reduction in trust in the number 
for verbal/less precise expressions of uncertainty (e.g. “somewhat higher or lower”) than for 
numerical expressions (e.g. point estimate with range).  
 
5.3.2 Expression vii: mentioning uncertainty.  
Some research has studied the effect of mentioning uncertainty, typically a combination of 
uncertainty about an object and uncertainty about the underlying quality or strength of 
evidence, on trust and credibility. Jensen and colleagues studied the effect of uncertainty in 
news stories on trust in the medical profession [134], and on trust in and expertise of 
journalists and scientists [133]. Jensen [133] found that people viewed both scientists and 
journalists as more trustworthy when they had read news stories presenting higher levels of 
uncertainty that were attributed to the primary scientists (disclosure, compared to expert 
disagreement). There were no effects on the perceived expertise of scientists and 
journalists. Jensen and colleagues [134] found no effect of uncertainty on people’s trust in 
the medical profession, but they did find that people expressed increased trust when they 
read articles in which the uncertainty was mentioned by unaffiliated researchers (expert 
disagreement) rather than statements from scientists whose research was covered in the 
article.  
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Yet, other work shows that when uncertainty is introduced through a conflict between 
experts (e.g. half of experts say that studies show a link between aluminium and Alzheimer’s 
disease whereas the other half deny such a link), source credibility and trustworthiness tend 
to decline compared to when all experts agree there is uncertainty [151]. Similarly, Löfstedt 
[152] observes that in the context of the Swedish acrylamide scare, public disagreements 
between epidemiologists and toxicologists over the link between acrylamide and cancer led 
to public distrust in scientists. To some extent, uncertainty created through divergent 
scientific perspectives may be dependent on context. For example, Jensen and Hurley [153] 
found that uncertainty about the health effects of dioxin (a possible carcinogen) increased 
the credibility and trustworthiness of scientists, whereas the opposite pattern was found for 
conflicting stories about wolf reintroduction in the United States. 
 
Wiedemann and Schütz [154] evaluated the effects of disclosing uncertainty in the context 
of health risks from exposure to electromagnetic fields. In one experimental condition, 
scientists verbally acknowledged that “substantial uncertainties exist as to whether current 
protection from electrosmog is sufficient”. Such verbal disclosure of uncertainty did not 
undermine public trust in health protection. On the other hand, verbal uncertainty 
expressed through caveats and limitations (e.g. “perhaps”, “maybe”, “possibly”) in 
economic news has been associated with lower public confidence in the economy 
[155,156]. 
 
In sum, until more research is conducted, it is difficult to make firm conclusions about these 
mixed findings across domains about the way and extent to which communicating 
uncertainty affects the perceived credibility of and trust in both the message and the 
communicator.  
 
5.4 The effect of communicating uncertainty on behaviour and decision-making 
For many communicators, the most important aspect of communicating uncertainty is its 
effect on people’s behaviour and decision-making. This is particularly relevant in the context 
of decision making under uncertainty, for example in medical or policy-relevant contexts. 
Although we recognize the large literature on ambiguity aversion [94,157], to our 
knowledge there has been no systematic empirical investigation of the effect of epistemic 
uncertainty communication on people’s behaviour and decision-making. Nonetheless, 
somewhat scattered results do exist and there have been some broadly relevant studies. For 
example, Tversky and Shafir [158] illustrate how the introduction of uncertainty can 
influence decision-making. In a hypothetical decision-making scenario involving a vacation 
package, students who were uncertain about a verifiable fact (e.g. whether or not they 
passed a qualifying exam), were much less likely to book a trip (compared to students who 
were certain), and even willing to pay a small sum of money to postpone their decision. 
Although hypothetical, these results suggest that communicating uncertainty may lead 
people to postpone their decision-making in some contexts. 
 
In contrast, much more research exists when it comes to aleatory uncertainty about the 
future. For example, Morton, Rabinovich, Marshall, and Bretschneider [159] find that 
describing the uncertainty around future climate change impacts (a point estimate vs. point 
estimate with a range) influences people’s intention to act pro-environmentally, depending 
on how the impacts are framed (positive vs. negative). As another example, Joslyn and 
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LeClerc [160] studied the effect of uncertainty in weather forecasts on (hypothetical) 
decision-making by asking participants to assume the role of a road maintenance company 
considering whether to pay to salt the roads. They found that uncertainty communication 
increased decision quality and trust in the forecast. In particular, participants in the 
uncertainty condition took appropriate precautionary action and withheld unnecessary 
action more often than participants in the deterministic forecast condition. Similarly, Driver 
and colleagues [161] conducted experiments to investigate whether people can make better 
investment choices if presented with visual rather than verbal descriptions of investment 
uncertainty. Specifically, the authors found that representing financial disclosure (a risk-
return indicator) pictorially helped people better rank funds according to their risk and 
return profile and better assess their suitability when making financial decisions.  
 
It therefore seems clear that uncertainty has the potential to influence decision-making 
across domains, from medical decision-making to consumer and environmental behaviour, 
but more systematic research is needed to investigate explicitly how epistemic uncertainty 
influences human behaviour and decision-making. As Raftery recommended in the context 
of probabilistic forecasting [162], this will involve research that bears in mind the diversity 
and types of audiences; and the psychological impact that the presentation of uncertainty 
has on its audience.  
 
5.5 Conclusions about the psychological effects of communicating uncertainty 
Although the scattered evidence available suggests that communicating direct epistemic 
uncertainty does affect people’s cognition, emotion, trust, and behaviour and decision-
making, little has been done within a systematic framework — identifying the aspects of the 
communication that are being manipulated and therefore delineating their precise effects. 
Even within a framework, such as the one we have suggested, being systematic is very 
difficult: formats are inevitably correlated with the precision of the expression, with 
numbers having the potential to convey the most precise information and verbal 
expressions the least, and so any attempt to vary format will often also vary the expression. 
The content is essentially different.   
 
Audience reactions to different magnitudes of uncertainty would also seem an important 
cognitive outcome for communication of epistemic uncertainty. However, there appear to 
be few empirical studies investigating this phenomenon: initial work in the context of a 
(fictitious) news article [150] showed no change in the public’s trust in either the number 
communicated or the communicators of the uncertainty when different magnitudes of 
uncertainty were communicated as a numeric range. It may well be that uncertainty needs 
to be put into context for a non-specialist audience in order for its magnitude to be of any 
relevance. Without specialist knowledge of a subject, it may be impossible for an audience 
to judge whether a given magnitude of uncertainty is important or not. It could also be that 
an audience that is not basing a decision on a particular fact, number or hypothesis does not 
have enough vested interest to be discriminatory and therefore may have a more binary 
approach to judging whether information is ‘certain or not’. 
 
Considering the literature on the psychological effects of different expressions of 
uncertainty, however, suggests several interesting preliminary findings. We can be relatively 
confident that there is substantial individual variability in how people understand 
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uncertainty through verbal qualifying statements or predefined distributions. This can lead 
to a gap between how people understand the communication of uncertainty and the actual 
intention of the communicator. Accordingly, the appropriate use of graphical visualisations 
and numerical uncertainty may aid in ensuring a correct understanding and comprehension 
of uncertainty. Yet, although people’s understanding of numbers seems more consistent, 
there is still scope for variability in interpretation, for example, when it comes to different 
interpretations of distributions underlying numerical ranges. This might lead to different 
psychological and behavioural outcomes, depending on whether people interpret the lower, 
midpoint, or upper values to be the more likely “true” value.  
 
The limited research that has investigated the effects of epistemic uncertainty 
communication on emotions has found mixed results, which suggests that (epistemic) 
uncertainty does not always have a negative effect on people’s affective states. This is an 
important preliminary conclusion, given the often-cited concern that people are generally 
averse toward any kind of uncertainty [92,159]. What’s more, uncertainty about the future 
can interfere with people’s basic psychological needs for control and predictability [163], 
whereas epistemic uncertainty about the past and present may not always be subject to the 
same concerns. People also make forecasting errors about how much they (dis)like 
uncertainty [164]; and so more research is needed to evaluate how the presence of 
uncertainty about facts and numbers interacts with people’s emotional and affective 
dispositions toward the issue. 
 
Similarly, several smaller scale studies have revealed conflicting information about whether 
explicitly acknowledging scientific uncertainty — either numerically or verbally — enhances 
or undermines the extent to which people trust or find the information credible. It also 
remains unclear how the effect of uncertainty on trust interacts with communication format 
or characteristics of the communicator. The preliminary conclusion that explicitly 
acknowledging uncertainty does not always lead to an inherent decrease in public trust or 
credibility, though, is worth noting, and suggests an important potential avenue for future 
research. 
 
Finally, if it is the case that some audiences are insensitive to changes in the magnitude of 
the uncertainty being communicated, then it could be said that the communication is not 
delivering the intended message. This could have important consequences for decisions 
made by audiences based on the communication (as outlined in Box 1). It therefore seems 
critical that research on the communication of uncertainty explicitly investigates the effect 
of manipulating the magnitude of uncertainty. For work with a directly practical outcome 
(such as the transmission of an important message to decision-makers), this will be a useful 
indication of the success of the message. For work with a research focus, it will help 
elucidate different audiences’ relationship with uncertainty, and how context and different 
forms of expression affect the perceptions of magnitude. 
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Case studies in communicating uncertainty  
Although different fields and organisations have taken different approaches to the problem 
of communicating uncertainty, our framework has revealed considerable commonalities.  
Here we examine two important areas in more detail: official economic statistics and 
climate change. The latter domain, in particular, is often associated with making predictions 
about an uncertain future, but we focus on the way in which it expresses epistemic 
uncertainty. We illustrate how both domains fit into the structure established above, and 
hopefully provide insights for others wanting to communicate uncertainty.   
 
 
 
Case Study 1:  Official Economic Statistics 
1. What epistemic uncertainties are there? 
Objects of uncertainty: Measurable historical economic variables such as real gross 
domestic product (GDP), inflation and employment.  
 
Sources of uncertainty: Statistical offices typically provide estimates of economic variables 
using surveys that are subject to both sampling and non-sampling errors. Manski [165] re-
interprets these sources of data uncertainty as “transitory” and “permanent”. “Transitory” 
statistical uncertainty arises because data collection takes time, with ‘early’ data releases 
revised over time as new information arrives. “Permanent” statistical uncertainty does not 
diminish over time and arises due to the limited data available (e.g. sampling uncertainty 
due to a finite sample), and/or data quality (e.g. survey non-response). 
 
Statistical offices are under pressure, by policymakers and other users of the data, to 
produce timely estimates. But this induces a trade-off with data reliability, since timely data 
rely more strongly on incomplete surveys. For example, until July 2018, the UK Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) produced a “preliminary” estimate of GDP based on about 44% of 
the sample around 27 days after the end of the reference quarter. But since July 2018 they 
provide their “first” estimate of GDP around 40 days after the end of the month/quarter, 
based on about 60% of the sample. This “first” estimate of GDP should therefore be 
expected to be revised as more sample data become available. But the ONS hopes that its 
new publication model will deliver less uncertain estimates of economic growth, given that, 
because of pushing publication back by two weeks, they are based on a higher sampling 
percentage.  
 
Types of uncertainty: Non-sampling errors generally give rise to caveats about the quality of 
the underlying evidence (indirect uncertainty), while sampling errors may be quantified as 
direct margins of error on the quantity of interest (direct uncertainty). 
 
2. In what form are the uncertainties communicated? 
Expressions and formats of uncertainty:  Table 2 shows, using examples of UK and US 
practice for GDP, inflation and employment, how national statistical offices provide an 
incomplete expression of the uncertainty associated with their data according to our 
proposed scale for “numbers”. They use verbal, numeric and (much less commonly) visual 
formats of communication.  
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Table 2: Cross-country and cross-variable measurement and communication of 
uncertainty about economic statistics 
 Economic Variables 
 GDP Inflation  Employment 
Economic Concept:  The value of all final goods 
and services produced 
within a country in a given 
period of time 
The rate of increase in 
prices for goods and 
services 
Total number of people 
employed in a country 
Geographic source:  United Kingdom, Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
Economic 
Statistics:  
Gross Domestic Product, 
chained volume measure 
Consumer Prices Index 
(CPI) 12-month rate 
Number of people aged 
16 to 64 at work 
Source of 
Uncertainty:  
Revisions from updated 
sample information, 
correction of errors, 
benchmarking, updated base 
period for constant price 
estimates and 
methodological changes (see 
[166]). 
Price index weighting 
methodology and survey 
design.  
Sampling error and 
revisions 
Uncertainty 
Communication in 
Headline Press 
Release: 
v. single number with 
qualifying verbal 
statements 
“UK gross domestic product 
was estimated to have 
increased by 0.4% in Quarter 
3 2017, a similar rate of 
growth to the previous two 
quarters.” 
viii. no mention of 
uncertainty 
“The Consumer Prices Index 
including owner occupiers’ 
housing costs (CPIH) 12-
month inflation rate was 2.8% 
in October 2017, unchanged 
from September 2017.” 
viii. no mention of 
uncertainty
“There were 32.06 million 
people in work, 14,000 
fewer than for April to June 
2017 but 279,000 more 
than for a year earlier.”
Uncertainty 
Communication in 
supporting 
documentation:  
v. single number with 
qualifying verbal 
statements 
“The estimate is subject to 
revision as more data 
become available, but the 
revisions are typically small 
between the preliminary and 
third estimates of GDP, with 
no upward or downward bias 
to these revisions.” (ONS 
website). 
Revisions are not quantified; 
but references to real-time 
data sources and studies are 
provided in the ONS website.  
v. single number with 
qualifying verbal 
statements 
The release includes a section 
on “Quality and 
methodology”. But this does 
not explicitly mention 
uncertainty due to sampling 
and/or non-sampling errors. 
iii. A range or an order-of-
magnitude assessment 
The release includes a 
section on “Quality and 
methodology”. This 
discusses and provides 
uncertainty estimates such 
as 95% confidence intervals 
due to sampling errors 
[167]. 
 
Geographic Source:  United States, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) 
Economic 
Statistics: 
Real Gross Domestic 
Product 
Percent changes in 
Consumer Price Index for 
All Urban Consumers 
Total nonfarm payroll 
employment 
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Source of 
uncertainty: 
Revisions from updated 
sample information, updated 
base period for constant 
price estimates and 
methodological changes 
[168]. 
 
Sampling error and 
revisions 
Sampling error and 
revisions 
Uncertainty 
Communication in 
Headline Press 
Release: 
viii. no mention of 
uncertainty 
 “Real gross domestic 
product increased at an 
annual rate of 3.0 percent in 
the third quarter of 2017.” 
viii. no mention of 
uncertainty 
 “The Consumer Price Index 
for All Urban Consumers (CPI-
U) rose 0.1 percent in October 
on a seasonally adjusted 
basis, the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistic reported 
today.”
viii. no mention of 
uncertainty 
 “Total nonfarm payroll 
employment rose by 
228,000 in November 
(2017), and the 
unemployment rate was 
unchanged at 4.1 percent, 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reported today.” 
Uncertainty 
Communication in 
supporting 
documentation:  
v. single number with 
qualifying verbal 
statements 
“The Bureau emphasized 
that the third-quarter 
advance estimate released 
today is based on source 
data that are incomplete or 
subject to further revision by 
the source agency (see 
“Source Data for the 
Advance Estimate” on page 
2)”. Average data revision 
estimates are also provided 
in this press release, 
although these are not used 
to form confidence intervals. 
iii A range or an order-of-
magnitude assessment 
Lower down in their press 
release published in their 
website as the data is 
released the BLS discuss and 
quantify sampling errors 
numerically.  
iii. A range or an order-of-
magnitude assessment 
In separate documentation 
to the press release the BLS 
provide 90% confidence 
intervals [169]. These are 
also plotted visually at 
https://www.bls.gov/c
harts/employment-
situation/otm-
employment-change-
by-industry-
confidence-
intervals.htm 
 
 
 
Table 2 distinguishes if and how statistical offices communicate data uncertainty in the 
“headline” press releases, that typically form the focus of the media when disseminating the 
data release more widely, from what is said in “smaller print” (including lower down an 
often long press release) and/or perhaps in separate technical reports or online. As Table 2 
shows, data estimates for these three economic variables are all reported as point estimates 
in the headline data release, even though textual and – perhaps more so in the US than the 
UK - quantitative acknowledgements of the uncertainties associated with the data do follow 
elsewhere, but arguably with limited prominence. For example, while the BLS do publish, 
both numerically and visually, margins of error on US unemployment estimates these are 
not found in the headline releases. 90% confidence interval graphs are found only on a 
pulldown menu on a webpage accessible from the press release.  
 
Manski [170] has similarly documented the “incredible certitude” in official economic 
statistics, given that they are commonly reported as point estimates without adequate 
attention paid to uncertainties. 
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For some economic variables, such as employment, it is easier to quantify sampling 
uncertainties; but for others, such as GDP, it is understandably more challenging. For 
example, to quote the ONS: “The estimate of GDP … is currently constructed from a wide 
variety of data sources, some of which are not based on random samples or do not have 
published sampling and non-sampling errors available. As such it is very difficult to measure 
both error aspects and their impact on GDP. While development work continues in this area, 
like all other G7 national statistical institutes, we don't publish a measure of the sampling 
error or non-sampling error associated with GDP” [171].  
 
This rather limited communication runs counter to the longstanding awareness of economic 
statisticians of the importance of quantifying and communicating the uncertainties 
associated with such economic statistics; Morgenstern [172] assessed the accuracy of 
economic data and argued for the provision of error estimates in official statistics sixty years 
ago. But, as Manski [165] concludes in a rare paper on this topic in a leading academic 
economics journal, economic data continue to be communicated often with little upfront 
indication of their uncertainties.  
 
While Table 2 provides evidence of limited quantification and communication of data 
uncertainty by statistical offices, independent users of data have provided their own 
uncertainty estimates. A prominent example is the Bank of England’s “fan chart” for GDP 
growth, as shown in Figure 6.  As well as indicating the uncertainty associated with their 
forecasts, this figure provides a quantitative visual indication of the uncertainty associated 
with historical and recent official ONS estimates of GDP; see [173] for further analysis. More 
generally, many statistical offices and central banks now publish and maintain “real-time” 
macroeconomic databases (e.g., see [166,174]) to reflect the fact that many economic 
statistics, like GDP, are revised over time. These real-time data are commonly used by 
researchers in macroeconomics and finance again to acknowledge the data uncertainty. 
Indeed, the Bank of England form their view about data uncertainty, in part, based on the 
revisions properties of official GDP data. 
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Figure 6: Bank of England’s fan chart for GDP growth (from the November 2017 “Inflation 
Report” [175]). In their notes to this chart the Bank write: “The fan chart depicts the 
probability of various outcomes for GDP growth… To the left of the vertical dashed line, the 
distribution reflects the likelihood of revisions to the data over the past; to the right, it 
reflects uncertainty over the evolution of GDP growth in the future…The fan chart is 
constructed so that outturns are also expected to lie within each pair of the lighter green 
areas on 30 occasions. In any particular quarter of the forecast period, GDP growth is 
therefore expected to lie somewhere within the fan on 90 out of 100 occasions.” 
 
 
3. What are the psychological effects of uncertainty communication? 
Although Gilbert [176] and Clements and Galvao [177] show that US equity market 
participants are aware of and react to BEA’s GDP data revisions, there seems to have been 
no research on if and/or how users of economic statistics interpret the estimates as being 
measured subject to uncertainties, or how different users might react to uncertainties 
communicated to them directly by the statistical office. The importance of undertaking such 
research is reinforced by Wallis [178] who shows, in the specific context of the Bank of 
England’s fan chart (seen above), how the same probability distribution can be drawn in 
different ways. Moreover, the Bank itself presents the fan chart above both using the “wide 
bands” shown in Figure 6 and “narrow bands”. It is not known how users react to these 
alternative representations of uncertainty. But the importance of undertaking such research 
is apparent from the lively online discussion about the usefulness, or otherwise, of the Bank 
of England’s fan charts, such as the somewhat sarcastic discussion on the Financial Times’ 
blog on “Save the (in)famous fan charts!” [179].  
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Conclusions 
According to the Code of Practice for official statistics for England and Wales [180], 
‘trustworthiness’ forms the first of the three pillars of official statistics, and the Code 
emphasises the need for clear communication of uncertainties. Nevertheless, the analysis 
above shows rather limited and not-so-prominent communication of uncertainty about 
official statistics, in spite of the strong example set by the Bank of England. Direct 
expressions of uncertainty may be provided, but the strength of the underlying evidence 
(indirect uncertainty) is communicated through caveats which may or may not be read and 
understood by their audiences. 
 
As administrative, microdata data are increasingly exploited to supplement or indeed 
replace traditional surveys, the assessment of uncertainty will face a range of new 
difficulties. While administrative data are not based on a survey, they also can have 
inadequacies due to quality, coverage and relevance. The resulting uncertainty is difficult to 
quantify: Manski [28] provides a methodology to quantify non-sampling errors due to 
survey non-response, that derives interval estimates with no assumptions made about the 
values of the missing data, and this promises to become a vital area of research. 
 
The effects of uncertainty communication on cognition, emotion, trust and behaviour in 
economics statistics appear not to have been studied. 
 
 
 
Case Study 2: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
1. What epistemic uncertainties are there? 
Objects of uncertainty: Measurable historical changes in a variety of climate system 
variables, such as average global surface temperature and sea level rise.  
 
Sources of uncertainty: In the context of climate change, epistemic uncertainty often refers 
to uncertainty about the values of parameters in scientific models or structural uncertainty 
about the underlying model and its ability to accurately represent the climate system. In 
addition, uncertainty in model-based estimations of fluctuations in historical climate data 
may arise due to differences in the types of environmental data that are used as input for 
climate models and, for IPCC models that look at trends in the earth’s surface temperature 
over the last 150 years, uncertainty can further arise from data gaps (proxy data) and a 
variety of instrumental and measurement errors [40]. Figure 7 displays uncertainty in a 
historical series using a simple shading of a 90% interval. 
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Figure 7: Global average temperature change (IPCC). Adapted from the IPCC [40]. Diagram 
showing the relative importance of different uncertainties, and their evolution in time. (a) 
Decadal mean surface temperature change (°C) from the historical record (black line), with 
climate model estimates of uncertainty for historical period (grey), along with future climate 
projections and uncertainty. Values are normalised by means from 1961 to 1980. The given 
uncertainty range of 90% means that the temperature is estimated to be in that range, with 
a probability of 90%. 
 
 
Types of uncertainty: Limitations in scientific understanding and lack of confidence in some 
models are expressed as caveats (indirect uncertainty), while errors which can be 
confidently modelled give rise to direct probabilities on the quantity of interest (absolute, 
direct uncertainties). Relative direct uncertainties, such as p-values, are rarely if ever used. 
 
2. In what form are the uncertainties communicated? 
Expressions and formats of uncertainty: The IPCC has a relatively long history of exploring 
how to effectively express different forms of uncertainty in their reports but has only 
recently started to begin incorporating insights from behavioural science. At present, 
uncertainty in the IPCC assessments is communicated using two metrics shown in Figure 8. 
Firstly, quantified measures of direct (absolute) uncertainty are expressed in verbal and 
probabilistic terms based on statistical analyses of observations, models, or expert 
judgment, corresponding to a pre-defined categorisation – expression iv in our framework. 
Secondly, indirect (underlying) uncertainties are expressed through a qualitative expression 
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of confidence in the validity of a finding based on the type, amount, quality, and consistency 
of evidence (which can include theory, models and expert judgment) [40] [p. 36]. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Expressions of uncertainty in IPCC reports (left) and confidence in science (right) 
[40] [p. 36] 
 
 
Likelihood provides calibrated language (left panel) for describing quantified uncertainty for 
a single event, a climate parameter, an observed trend, or projected future change. 
Importantly, the likelihood table is not preferred when a full probability distribution is 
available instead. Confidence level (right panel) is based on the scientific evidence (robust, 
medium, limited) and working group agreement (high, medium, low). Robustness of 
evidence is measured by the degree of consistent and independent (multiple) lines of high 
quality inquiry.  
 
To illustrate the use of these tables with a written example from the fifth IPCC report; “It is 
certain that global mean surface temperature has increased since the late 19th century. […] 
For average annual Northern Hemisphere temperatures, the period 1983–2012 was very 
likely the warmest 30-year period of the last 800 years (high confidence) and likely the 
warmest 30-year period of the last 1400 years (medium confidence).” [40] [p. 38]. 
 
3. What are the psychological effects of uncertainty communication?  
In the first three reports, the IPCC generated confusion by not systematically 
communicating relevant uncertainty properly [181,182]. The IPCC tried to resolve this 
problem by verbally communicating uncertainty using seven verbal quantifiers (e.g. “very 
likely”, see Fig. 7) with the probability translation (likelihood) table supplied in an appendix. 
Part of the reason for this is that verbal quantifiers can help bridge disagreements between 
authors, especially when uncertainty cannot be condensed into a single number. Yet, much 
research in psychology has shown that verbal quantifiers of uncertainty create an “illusion 
of communication” because different people interpret such terms differently across 
different contexts [183]. In fact, as has already been mentioned, some research has been 
conducted on people’s interpretation of the IPCC’s uncertainty communication strategies. In 
a multi-national study, with 25 samples from 24 countries in 17 languages, Budescu and 
colleagues [110] found that people’s interpretation of these verbal quantifiers were 
systematically inconsistent with the IPCC’s intended guidelines. Specifically, the general 
pattern was regressive so that people underestimated high probabilities and overestimated 
low probabilities. Moreover, average consistency with the IPCC guidelines appeared to be 
higher in countries that express greater concern about climate change [110]. Subsequent 
research has found that a “dual-approach” combining the verbal quantifiers with 
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corresponding (numeric) probability ranges (e.g. “very likely, >90%”) creates much stronger 
cross-sample homogeneity in people’s interpretation of the terms in a way that is more 
consistent with the IPCC guidelines (see [110,181,184]).  
 
Conclusions 
The IPCC’s approach to communicating uncertainty has been developed over a long period 
in order to bring some standardisation to a huge and diverse team, producing high-profile 
documents in a deeply contested area of science. Their approach to direct uncertainty 
through verbal descriptors calibrated with probability ranges has been subject to 
considerable evaluation, although their expression of confidence in the underlying science 
(indirect uncertainty) has not been empirically researched. It is notable that so many areas, 
from climate to health to education, have arrived at rather similar ways of communicating 
uncertainty through both direct and indirect expressions, and these common features form 
the basis for our structure. 
 
Both these case studies consider potential contested topics, where communicators may 
wish to portray uncertainty in different ways in order to produce different psychological 
effects on the reader. Whereas the official sources of information in both cases make 
attempts to communicate uncertainty ‘neutrally’, secondary users of their information (such 
as media organisations) often don’t. In the case of official economic statistics, for example, 
media coverage overwhelmingly avoids mention of epistemic uncertainty. This leads to 
inevitable concern and discussion when revisions to statistics occur (e.g., [185]), which itself 
reveals that readers thought the estimates more certain than they actually were – and their 
comprehension, emotions and decision-making were all likely to have been altered by the 
change in uncertainty communication caused by a revision. In the case of climate change, 
there has been much discussion over whether over-emphasis or under-emphasis of 
uncertainty in communications has created changes in the comprehension, emotions or 
behaviour of different audiences – although the lack of empirical evidence specifically on 
this topic makes those opinions pure hypothetical, if entirely plausible [186]. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
There are many ways in which we are uncertain about the world around us, without even 
considering unavoidable uncertainty about the future. Not acknowledging or adequately 
communicating these uncertainties, leading to unwarranted degrees of weight being put on 
certain pieces of evidence in the process of decision-making, can have disastrous 
consequences (as demonstrated by the example in Box 1). In this review, we therefore 
aimed to summarise what is known about epistemic uncertainty communication, the range 
of communication methods currently used, and their psychological effects on people’s 
cognition, affect, trust, behaviour and decision-making. This work is intended as the first 
and necessary step towards the goal of an empirically-based guidance for everyone who 
works with epistemic uncertainty on the forms of communication that suit their object of 
uncertainty, their audience, and their aims. 
 
Based on an interdisciplinary approach, we have developed an overarching framework that 
clarifies the components that make up the umbrella term ‘uncertainty’ and those that 
comprise the process of communication, affecting an audience’s reaction to uncertainty 
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communication (see Figure 1). This provides a structure both for understanding what is 
done and what might be investigated in the future. The framework comprises several novel 
and hopefully useful elements: 
 
• The identification of three objects of uncertainty: categorical (facts), continuous 
(numbers) and hypothetical (theories or scientific models that describe the world) 
(Section 2.1). 
• The distinction between two levels of uncertainty: direct uncertainty about specific 
facts, numbers and science (both absolute and relative), and indirect uncertainty: the 
quality of our underlying knowledge (Section 2.3). 
• A list of alternative expressions for direct uncertainty based on an analysis of practice 
across many disciplines (Section 3.1 and Figure 2). 
 
We show how this framework could be useful to those trying to understand the 
communication of uncertainty by using it as the underlying basis in a review of the empirical 
evidence of the psychological effects of the different expressions of (direct) uncertainty on 
different audiences (Sections 5), and to deconstruct how uncertainty is communicated in 
two example fields (official economic statistics and climate change). 
 
Our review of the empirical evidence of the effects of epistemic uncertainty communication 
showed that different uncertainties, and different expressions of those uncertainties, can 
have varied psychological effects on their audiences. Most research has focused on 
cognitive effects of uncertainty communication, showing that there is considerably 
variability in people’s interpretation of various expressions of uncertainty, such as numerical 
ranges or verbal qualifiers. Whereas several studies have shown that uncertainty 
communication can affect people’s affective responses and trust, more research is needed 
to understand under what conditions these effects can be positive or negative. To our 
knowledge, no systematic empirical research has been conducted about the effects of 
epistemic uncertainty communication on behaviour and decision-making. Nevertheless, 
general awareness of the potential intended and unintended effects is a first step to 
understanding how best to communicate uncertainty. This need is demonstrated by the 
examples that we found of communication schemes not based on empirical evidence, which 
have great potential to mislead (Box 4). The reputational and real risk to life of 
miscommunication of uncertainty is great, as the example in Box 1 highlights. 
 
In addition, the psychological literature shows that different audiences, and even individuals 
within those audiences, are likely to have different reactions to various presentations of 
uncertainty. Many factors – from their personal characteristics and experiences to their 
relationship with the topic and with everyone involved in the production and 
communication of the information – could affect their responses. Both researchers and 
practitioners in this field need to recognise these factors and be aware of their potential 
effects. 
 
Our scope in this paper necessarily had to be limited, not covering more general issues of 
user-engagement and communication design, for example the important idea of layered or 
progressive disclosure of information [187], or informal or interpersonal communication 
such as that between doctor and patient. It is worth noting that a review of research on the 
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effects of visualisations of quantitative health risks concluded that the features of 
visualisations that improved accuracy of interpretation of the information are different from 
features that encouraged behaviour change; and features that viewers liked best may not 
be supportive of either of these goals [188]. These findings stress the importance of 
empirical evaluation of the effects of different formats of communication.    
 
Of course, we are also only considering epistemic uncertainty about the past and present 
and not aleatory uncertainty about the future. However, these two are not always clearly 
distinct. For example, within the context of health information, a communication ostensibly 
about ‘your risk’ of a future event (apparently mostly aleatory uncertainty) could in reality 
be a measure of the current state of your body where the uncertainties are often purely 
epistemic (e.g. ‘your cardiovascular risk’ is actually a measure of the current health of your 
cardiovascular system). However, although the uncertainties are technically only about the 
present, the audience is likely to perceive them – framed as they are in terms of a future risk 
– as about the future. These are complexities that will need to be considered in empirical 
work. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, we can foresee a time when such a framework could be 
used to create a practical guide to help people identify the uncertainties inherent in their 
work (‘what’ they want to communicate) and then identify the ideal form and expression 
that they should use to communicate those uncertainties, bearing in mind the medium, 
audience and desired effect. Until then, our best advice to both researchers and 
practitioners is summarised in Boxes 5a and 5b. We hope this structured approach will aid 
people to communicate the epistemic uncertainty that exists about facts, numbers, and 
science confidently and unapologetically – an approach we like to call “muscular 
uncertainty”.    
 
 
Box 5a: Advice to communicators of uncertainty 
 
When communicating evidence, consider: 
 
- What do you have uncertainty about? Do you have uncertainty about the underlying 
hypothesis behind your evidence, and/or about the specific numbers involved, and/or 
about categorical facts that you want to claim? For instance, you may have different 
levels of uncertainty about the fact that the mean global temperature has risen since 
1850; that the temperature rise has been approximately 1.8 degrees, or that the 
temperature rise has been the result of the ‘greenhouse effect’. 
 
- Why is there uncertainty? Is it because of unavoidable natural variation, because of the 
difficulties of measuring, because of limited knowledge about the underlying processes 
or because there is disagreement between experts? Thinking about this may help you 
identify more objects you are uncertain about, and about how your audience might 
perceive the uncertainty. 
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- For each object that you are uncertain about, and for each source of uncertainty, do you 
have both direct (specifically about that aspect) and indirect (quality of evidence) levels 
of uncertainty? You will probably want to, or have to, communicate them separately. 
 
When you have identified all of the above, choose an expression of your uncertainties that 
suits the degree of precision you have (see Section 3.1 for a list). The media available to you 
will affect the formats (e.g. graphical) and expressions you can use, but also consider your 
audience, their relationships to you and to the subject, and the effects you want to have on 
them. The psychology literature has little guidance as yet on the effects of each expression 
of uncertainty, but we know that stating uncertainty does not necessarily undermine trust. 
 
Most importantly, keep your expressions of the magnitude of uncertainty clearly separate 
from the magnitude of any evidence you are trying to communicate (e.g. not confusing the 
effect of processed meat as a carcinogen – low - with the certainty that it is one – high. See 
Box 4), and if you can test the effect of your communication with your audience at all, then 
do (we recommend the FDA’s excellent guide when attempting this[189], and please share 
the results – see Box 5b)!  
 
 
 
 
Box 5b: Advice to researchers of how to communicate uncertainty around evidence 
 
When designing your studies, it would be useful to clearly identify and state: 
 
- Is the uncertainty you are studying about the past/present or about the future - and is it 
likely to be perceived as past/present or future by the audience? 
 
- What are the psychological effects you are studying? Cognition (including 
understanding), emotional (affect), trust, or behaviour (including decision-making)? 
 
- What are you varying about the uncertainty itself? (The object – is it a categorical or 
continuous object or is it a hypothesis; the source of the uncertainty; the level of the 
uncertainty – is it directly about the object or is it indirect: about the quality of the 
underlying evidence; or the magnitude?) 
 
- What are you varying about the way you communicate the uncertainty? (The form of 
the expression, the format, or the medium by which you communicate?) 
 
- Are there aspects of the people doing the assessing/communicating of the uncertainty 
or the audience (such as their demographics, or relationship with the communicators or 
with the subject) that might also affect the end points you are interested in? 
 
 
 
Because of its wide-reaching effects, uncertainty communication should be an important 
issue for policy makers, experts, and scientists across many fields. Many of those fields carry 
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the scars of attempts to avoid communicating uncertainty, or of poorly considered 
communications of uncertainty. These emphasise the need for a more considered approach 
to the topic, based on empirical evaluations done within an accepted framework. At 
present, however, this appears to be a science in its infancy. We can draw very limited 
conclusions from the current empirical work about the effects of communicating epistemic 
uncertainty and any underlying mechanisms. There is therefore a strong need for research 
specifically focused on communicating epistemic uncertainty and its impact on cognition, 
affect, trust, behaviour and decision-making. Early work needs confirming with large 
representative samples, and with observed or reported rather than hypothetical decision-
making, as we currently have very little idea about generalisability of findings. 
 
Most importantly, future work should try to manipulate components of communication 
systematically in order to unpick their effects and identify mediators. It seems extraordinary 
that so little is known about such an important topic, but our hope is that the framework we 
have set out here may help inform research in this vital and topical area.  
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Technical Appendix 
 
Formal communication of uncertainty based on statistical analysis 
 
Facts: Absolute uncertainty about facts can be expressed as probabilities, such as claiming 
there is 1 in 250 chance a foetus has a genetic abnormality. Such probabilities are 
expressing epistemic uncertainty rather than future randomness, and hence have a 
Bayesian interpretation in terms of reasonable betting odds. We have seen in Box 2 on 
forensics how Bayes theorem can take into account new evidence and provide a revised 
absolute uncertainty, expressed as the posterior odds, based on the relative uncertainty 
expressed by the likelihood ratio and the prior odds. Confidence in the underlying 
knowledge might be expressed as a verbal expression of confidence in the likelihood ratio 
and the prior odds, or formally by placing intervals on these quantities. 
 
Numbers: Let q be some unknown continuous quantity. Given relevant data, x, a classical 
uncertainty statement regarding q comprises a 95% confidence interval which can be 
denoted [qL(x), qU(x)], sometimes expressed as a margin of error: for example, UK 
unemployment figures for January 2018 report a change on the previous quarter -3,000, 
with a 95% confidence interval of  +/- 77,000.  Formally, assuming the assumptions 
underlying the analysis are correct, in 95% of occasions the random interval [qL(x), qU(x)] will 
include the true parameter value q.    
 
Relative uncertainty about q  is given by the likelihood function p(x|q),  considered as a 
function of q.  This provides the relative support for alternative possible values of q. A 
likelihood-based interval could be obtained from values of q whose likelihood is not less 
than, say 5% of the maximised likelihood, although this construction is rarely used. 
 
Within a Bayesian approach, absolute uncertainty about q is first expressed as a prior 
distribution p( q | M ), derived from external sources.  This is combined with the observed 
likelihood p( x | q, M ) to obtain a posterior distribution  
 
p( q| x, M ) µ  p( x| q, M )   p( q | M ) 
 
Uncertainty about q is therefore expressed as a full probability distribution, which may be 
summarised by say an interval containing 95% probability, known as a credible interval.  In 
stark contrast to the classical approach, it is permissible to claim there is 95% probability 
that a specific credible interval contains the true parameter’s value.  Note that if a locally 
uniform prior distribution is assumed the Bayesian credible interval and the classical 
confidence interval will exactly, or approximately, match, but have very different 
interpretations. 
 
Numerical intervals do not have to be based solely on statistical analysis, but can involve 
expert judgement. Metrology is defined as the "the science of measurement, embracing 
both experimental and theoretical determinations at any level of uncertainty in any field of 
science and technology", and the standard Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in 
Measurement (GUM) specifies two sources of uncertainty: ‘Type A’ uncertainty arises from 
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variation which can be reduced by taking further measurements, whereas ‘Type B’ 
uncertainty comes from non-random sources such as systematic errors and cannot be 
reduced simply by additional measurements (note their use of the term ‘Type’ differs from 
ours). It is recommended that each Type of uncertainty is quantified by a probability 
distribution – the Type A distribution will be based on statistical analysis, while the Type B 
distribution may be subjectively assessed on the basis on background knowledge. The 
‘combined standard uncertainty’ uc is the square root of variance of the sum of these two 
sources of uncertainty, and the ‘expanded uncertainty’ is a corresponding interval of 
specified coverage (say 95%). This may be communicated as a measurement +/- k uc.   
 
Scientific hypotheses:  Let H0 be a scientific hypothesis. Then, given a summary statistic x for 
which extreme values are unlikely if H0 were true, the P-value for H0 is the probability of 
observing such an extreme value of x, given H0.  The P-value can be considered a measure of 
relative uncertainty for H0, as low values indicate lack of support for H0 but do not provide a 
measure of absolute uncertainty.   
 
A common situation is that H0 represents the assumption that a parameter q takes on a 
specific value q0  while, under an alternative hypothesis H1, q can take on any value.  In this 
situation any observed P-value, say p, means that a 100(1-p)% confidence interval for q just 
excludes q0, thus corresponding to a direct expression of uncertainty about q. 
 
With competing hypotheses H0 and H1, relative support is given by the Bayes factor 
identified as B01= p( x| H0 )/p( x| H1 ), which is precisely the likelihood ratio applied to 
scientific hypotheses.  Unknown parameters need to be integrated out assuming prior 
distributions within each hypothesis, so that p(x|Hi) =  ò p(x|q,Hi) p(q | Hi) dq. 
 
It is possible to express absolute uncertainty about scientific hypotheses by assessing prior 
odds p(H0)/p(H1), and applying Bayes theorem to give posterior odds.5 But there is often 
reluctance to express probabilities for scientific hypotheses, since these are generally not 
directly provable as true or false. 
 
Information criteria provide a metric for comparing the support for alternative hypotheses. 
Let  q0 and q1 be the free parameters in H0 and H1 respectively, and suppose L is the ratio of 
maximized likelihoods, L = p(x|q0,max,  H0)/p(x|q1,max, H1), where the q0,max and q1,max 
represent the parameter values that maximize the respective likelihoods.  Then, for 
example, Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
are defined by 
 
AIC = - 2 log L – 2 p 
BIC = - 2 log L – p log n 
 
                                                        
5 Bayes theorem can also be applied across competing scientific models, in the face of what is often called 
“model uncertainty”: Bayesian Model Averaging involves treating the set of models, S, as an additional 
parameter and then integrating over S; e.g. see [190]. 
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where p is the difference in the number of free parameters in H0 and H1, and n is the sample 
size.  These are only relative measures of support, allowing a ranking in terms of the 
confidence held in alternative models. 
 
 
